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ABSTRACT
Corporate law is characterized by a pervasive divergence between
standards of conduct and standards of review. Courts often opine
on the relatively demanding standard of conduct, but their judg-
ments must be based on the more forgiving standard of review.
Commentators defend this state of affairs by insisting that it
provides guidance to directors without imposing ruinous liability.
However, the dichotomy can lead many, especially those who focus
on the bottom line, to call into question the meaningfulness of stan-
dards of conduct. Of particular concern is the increasing popularity,
in legal and scholarly circles, of the notion that fiduciary duty
standards of conduct are aspirational and unenforceable. This
theory, which I will call the “aspirational view,” is misguided. The
use of the term “aspirational” is especially problematic. Whatever else
“aspirational” may mean, it does not mean obligatory or mandatory.
Whether by design or only by effect, the aspirational view has the
potential to undermine fiduciary duties significantly. In this Article,
I will argue that fiduciary duty standards of conduct are in fact
duties—fully binding on actors even when they are not enforced. I
will also argue that the unenforced duty is a meaningful concept
because people obey the law for many different reasons, and not
simply out of fear of punishment.
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INTRODUCTION
A peculiar characteristic of corporate law is the divergence of
standards of conduct and standards of review.1 Standards of conduct
are rules of behavior that tell actors what is expected of them.
Standards of review, on the other hand, are rules of decision that
tell judges how to adjudicate cases. In many areas of law, the two
types of standards coincide. For example, in tort law, the standard
of conduct is ordinary care, and the standard of review is negligence,
which is generally defined as the lack of ordinary care. Intuitively,
it makes sense for actors to be judged by the standards with which
they are expected to comply. However, the two types of standards
need not align. In corporate law, they do not.
Corporate law is characterized by a pervasive divergence between
standards of conduct and standards of review. For example, with
respect to the duty of care, directors are expected to act with ordi-
nary care, but judges will review their actions not for negligence,
but for gross negligence.2 Likewise, with respect to the duty of
loyalty, directors are expected to act without conflicts of interests,
but judges will review their actions for fairness, and only if there is
a financial conflict of interest that rises to the level of self-dealing.3
It is similar for the duty of good faith: directors are expected to
honestly pursue the interests of the corporation and its sharehold-
ers, but judges will review their actions for intentional misconduct.4
The wisdom of this divergence may be debatable, but its existence
is not.
1. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L.REV. 437 (1993). Some scholars believe
that the divergence should apply only to directors and not to officers. See, e.g., Lyman P.Q.
Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 440 (2005)
(“[T]he business judgment rule ... does not and should not be extended to corporate officers
in the same broad manner in which it is applied to directors.”). I take no position on this issue
in this Article.
2. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds
by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 n.54 (Del. 2009).
3. Compare Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939), with Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 363 (Del. 1993) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812
(Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000)).
4. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 62-68 (Del. 2006), aff’g 907
A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005).
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Courts often will speak of fiduciary duties in lofty terms but
generally do not follow up with enforcement action. Ultimately,
claims of breach of fiduciary duty rarely lead to liability for direc-
tors. This is a predictable consequence of the divergence. Courts
often opine on the relatively demanding standard of conduct, but
their judgments must be based on the more forgiving standard of
review. Commentators defend this state of affairs by insisting that
it provides guidance to directors without imposing ruinous liability.5
However, the dichotomy can lead many, especially those who focus
on the bottom line, to call into question the meaningfulness of
standards of conduct.
Of particular concern is the increasing popularity, in legal and
scholarly circles, of the notion that fiduciary duty standards of
conduct are aspirational and unenforceable. This theory, which I
will call the “aspirational view,” is misguided. The use of the term
“aspirational” is especially problematic. “Aspiration” is generally
defined as “[a] strong desire for high achievement”6 or “[a] fervent
hope, wish, or goal”;7 synonyms include “ambition,” “hope,” “dream,”
and “ideal.”8 Perhaps the term is intended to elevate fiduciary duties
by appealing to grand moral ideals. Its actual effect, however, is to
debase fiduciary duties by rendering them optional and perhaps
even unachievable. After all, whatever else “aspirational” may
mean, it does not mean obligatory or mandatory. That standards of
conduct are sometimes described not only as unenforced but unen-
forceable only reinforces this impression. I believe that the growing
popularity of the aspirational view presents a dangerous develop-
ment that ought to be arrested. Whether by design or only by effect,
it has the potential to undermine fiduciary duties. To the extent
5. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697-98 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(“Fiduciaries who act faithfully and honestly on behalf of those whose interests they represent
are indeed granted wide latitude in their efforts to maximize shareholders’ investment.”),
aff’d, 906 A.2d 27; Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 464-65 (“One explanation is that the law wants
to send directors and officers a two-part message, as follows: ‘Your legal duty is to act with
due care. At the same time, we want to give you a certain amount of running room so that you
are not unduly risk averse or otherwise preoccupied with liability. Therefore, liability will
normally be imposed upon you only if there is a clear variance between the conduct required
by due care and your actual conduct.’”); see also infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
6. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 107 (4th ed. 2000).
7. ROGET’S II: THE NEW THESAURUS 54 (3d ed. 1995).
8. Id.
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that fiduciary duties are not enforced by courts, they depend upon
voluntary compliance. Presumably, greater compliance can be
expected for mandatory rules than for optional ones.9 Thus, moving
fiduciary duties from the former category into the latter likely would
have negative consequences: if directors come to believe that
standards of conduct are aspirational rather than mandatory, and
therefore optional, they can be expected to reduce compliance over
time.
In this Article, I will argue that the aspirational view is mis-
guided and that fiduciary duty standards of conduct are du-
ties—fully binding on actors even when they are not enforced. My
argument will proceed as follows. In Part I, I will provide examples
of the aspirational view in both judicial opinions and corporate law
scholarship. In Part II, I will explore the justification for the di-
vergence between standards of conduct and standards of review in
corporate law. I will explore two theories: the acoustic separation
theory, and what I call the room-for-error theory. Although the
acoustic separation theory might support the aspirational view, it
is deeply problematic and has not been adopted by the courts. The
room-for-error theory is a more solid justification for the divergence
and is the theory on which the courts and most scholars rely. This
theory provides greater support for the mandatory view of fiduciary
duties.
In Part III, I will argue that this divergence does not result in a
bifurcation of fiduciary duties, as is commonly believed, but rather
a tripartite division. First, standards of review create a minimum
threshold for liability: conduct that is sufficiently egregious will lead
to liability whereas less offensive conduct will not. Second, stan-
dards of conduct create a separate threshold: they distinguish be-
tween conduct that is required by law and conduct that is not. In
other words, standards of conduct include behavior that is required
by law but not legally enforced. Third, beyond standards of conduct,
there is behavior that is praiseworthy and ought to be encouraged,
but which the law does not specifically require. This, I will argue, is
9. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943,
1032 (1995) (“Having the rule means that its enforcement flows not necessarily from the
preference of the enforcer, but also possibly from an independent desire to conform to rules.”);
see also infra Part IV.C.
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the realm of aspiration. Best practices are a possible example:
generally, fiduciaries ought to consider following best practices, but
they are not necessarily required to do so. Thus, fiduciary duties are
not bifurcated between standards that are enforced and those that
are merely aspirational. Rather, there is a third category, which is
often overlooked, that comprises standards that are required but not
enforced.
In Part IV, I will defend this tripartite division and the manda-
tory view of fiduciary duties. First, I will argue that fiduciary duty
standards of conduct are not inherently aspirational and unenforce-
able. Although courts, at times, describe fiduciary duties in lofty
terms, they generally articulate standards of conduct that are quite
mundane and perfectly enforceable. Second, I will defend the con-
cept of the unenforced duty—which is, essentially, the heart of the
standard of conduct. I will argue that it is a meaningful concept
because people obey the law for many different reasons, and not
simply out of fear of punishment. Finally, I will propose the view
that fiduciary duties are not unenforced after all, but only imper-
fectly enforced—a fate shared by all laws.
As I hope to demonstrate, the fundamental flaw of the aspi-
rational view is that it conflates unenforced duties with aspirational
ideals. According to the aspirational view, a fiduciary’s duty of care
is merely to avoid gross negligence; to avoid negligence is merely
aspirational. This is much too little to expect and demand of
directors. Fiduciaries are supposed to be held to a higher standard
because of their position of trust, but under this view, they are
actually held to a much lower standard than the average person.
Strangers generally owe each other a duty to avoid negligence, yet
such conduct is considered aspirational for directors. This cannot be
correct. For good reasons, we may not hold directors accountable for
failure to meet the standard of conduct. However, we cannot pretend
that the standard of review satisfies the role of the standard of
conduct and that the standard of conduct is merely aspirational.
I. THE ASPIRATIONAL VIEW
The divergence between standards of conduct and standards of
review in corporate law raises an important question: what are we
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to make of standards of conduct? Standards of review are fairly
straightforward: they are the law as enforced. But standards of
conduct are not enforced. This can lead one to question what they
represent.
There are two obvious, competing theories. The first I shall call
the “mandatory view.” It maintains that standards of conduct are
mandatory rules of law that are binding upon fiduciaries even if
they are not legally enforced. A prominent proponent is Professor
Melvin Eisenberg, whose work highlighted the divergence in cor-
porate law. Despite the lack of enforcement, Eisenberg insists that
“[s]tandards of conduct in corporation law are neither meaningless
nor merely aspirational. Rather, they are legal rules intended to
control behavior.”10 This is my position as well. I shall call the
alternative theory the “aspirational view.” It does not consider stan-
dards of conduct to be law in the strict sense because they are not
subject to legal enforcement. Standards of conduct are not seen as
mandatory rules but rather as aspirational and unenforceable. As
between the two theories, the mandatory view is the more tradi-
tional one. Corporate law has developed under the implicit assump-
tion that standards of conduct are, in fact, law. The aspirational
view is becoming increasingly popular, however, and it deserves
attention.
In this Part, I will illustrate the aspirational view by reference to
legal scholarship and judicial opinions. Unfortunately, the aspi-
rational view remains somewhat inchoate, and no straightforward
manifesto exists to illustrate it perfectly. Many of the authors may
not be focused on the precise issue that is the subject of this Article.
Moreover, much of the terminology at issue is inherently ambigu-
ous. For example, even the key term, “standards of conduct,” is not
limited to its meaning in the context of fiduciary duties; any norm
can be considered a standard of conduct. Thus, we must review the
writings of others with care. What follows is intended to be more
illuminating than probative. Nevertheless, to varying degrees—even
if not always intentionally—the writings discussed in this Part
create the impression that compliance with fiduciary duty standards
of conduct is not mandatory.
10. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 464. Eisenberg rejects the contrary view as “reductionist.”
Id. at 462-64.
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A. Legal Scholarship
The aspirational view has its origins in academic legal scholar-
ship and can best be illustrated by reference to it. The works of
scholarship considered below are varied in nature. Some focus on
the issue in depth, whereas others deal with it in passing. Likewise,
some emphasize the aspirational nature of standards of conduct,
and some emphasize their unenforceability. Although there is no
single, clear statement of the aspirational view, it comes across to
varying degrees in each of the following works.
An example in which the issue is dealt with more or less in
passing can be found in an article written by Professor John
Coffee.11 In the article, Coffee confronts a perceived overuse of the
criminal law and addresses the criminalization of fiduciary duty law
through wire and mail fraud statutes.12 In the course of the
discussion, he describes the language of fiduciary duties as “soft-
edged and aspirational.”13 He goes on to say that standards of con-
duct “can never be fully realized nor even defined with specificity in
advance.”14 Although they may seem plausible enough in context,
these claims are actually unsupported assertions. Moreover, they
strongly suggest that standards of conduct are not only nonman-
datory but also inappropriate for enforcement and possibly even
unachievable ideals. Such casual statements are dangerous because
they can be readily accepted, easily repeated, and even emphasized
by others.15
A more thorough exploration of the issue can be found in the work
of Professor Edward Rock. Rock has argued that corporate gover-
nance operates largely through informal and/or nonlegal sanctions.16
He notes that corporate law decisions “sometimes impose legal
11. John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law
Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875 (1992).
12. Id. at 1879.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Lisa L. Casey, Twenty-Eight Words: Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties
Through Criminal Prosecution of Honest Services Fraud, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 48, 88-90
(2010).
16. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997).
2012] CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES 527
sanctions but surprisingly often do not.”17 Ultimately, “the principal
sanction is not directly financial but reputational.”18 He also
believes that judicial opinions on corporate law matters “can best be
thought of as ‘corporate law sermons,’”19 and suggests that it would
be better to “think of judges more as preachers than as policemen.”20
Although Rock does not use the word “aspirational” to describe
fiduciary duties, it is clearly the import of his theories. After all, the
terms “sermons” and “preachers” sound much less mandatory than
do “legal decisions” and “policemen.”
In another work, coauthored by Professor Michael Wachter, Rock
has developed the argument further.21 Rock and Wachter claim that
“the raison d’être of firms is to replace legal governance of relations
with nonlegally enforceable governance mechanisms (what are
sometimes called ‘norms’).”22 Under this view, “corporate law
emerges as a remarkably sophisticated mechanism for facilitating
self-governance by NLERS”—that is, “nonlegally enforceable rules
and standards.”23 “In other words, in this model, the boundary of the
firm is a jurisdictional boundary chosen by the participants.”24 Thus,
according to Rock and Wachter, fiduciary duties truly are, and ought
to be, largely unenforceable.25
In a recent article, Professors Claire Hill and Brett McDonnell
have argued that “extra-legal forces, particularly non-binding
pronouncements of the Delaware judiciary, are a critical adjunct to
corporate law.”26 According to them, “[l]aw, in its traditional sense,
is ... not fully able to do what the corporation and its shareholders
need it to do: make agents live up to their fiduciary duty to act with
undivided loyalty to their principals.”27 It is therefore necessary to
17. Id. at 1016.
18. Id. at 1012.
19. Id. at 1016.
20. Id.
21. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and
the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001).
22. Id. at 1622.
23. Id. at 1623.
24. Id. at 1650.
25. To be fair, the authors do not entirely eliminate enforcement of fiduciary duties. They
do believe in the need for a legally enforceable duty of loyalty. See id. at 1662.
26. Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the Optimal Penumbra
of Delaware Corporation Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333, 335 (2009).
27. Id. at 352.
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“invoke extra-legal forces such as reputation.”28 This is done by
means of what they call the “penumbra of Delaware corporate
law,”29 which they define as “extra-legal forces ... that extend[ ]
Delaware corporate law significantly beyond law on the books as
enforced.”30 Included in the penumbra are “non-binding pronounce-
ments of the Delaware judiciary”31—that is, standards of conduct.
Although they do not use the term, aspiration plays an important
role in Hill and McDonnell’s theory. According to them, “what is
‘required’ or indeed routinely done on account of what is in the
penumbra, is not the same as what is required and routinely done
under law.”32 Although they believe that the penumbra operates as
“an important influence on corporate director behavior”33 through
“reputational and norm-following mechanisms,”34 they are not legal-
ly enforceable. Indeed, standards of conduct are explicitly labeled as
“non-binding”35 and are not considered “[l]aw, in its traditional
sense.”36 Thus, for Hill and McDonnell, compliance with standards
of conduct seems much more aspirational than mandatory.
Finally, Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have done
some important work on the issue of trust in corporate law.37
Although they do not explicitly refer to fiduciary duties as aspira-
tional, their work takes on this tenor. After a thorough exploration
of the concept of trust and a review of the experimental evidence,
the authors turn their attention to “three enduring puzzles in
28. Id.
29. Id. at 357.
30. Id. at 335. Other definitions or descriptions of the penumbra include the following:
“the part of ‘law’ beyond law on the books and as enforced by judges that nevertheless
influences the behavior of corporate actors, especially directors and officers,” id. at 357; “an
important influence on corporate director behavior,” id. at 359; “including as it does ‘duties’
the violation of which would not yield a sanction,” id. at 360; “essentially, the law’s spirit,” id.
at 364; “effectively consists of norms,” id.; “force influencing director behavior by means other
than the imposition of liability or the threat thereof,” id. at 372.
31. Id. at 335.
32. Id. at 361.
33. Id. at 359.
34. Id. at 363.
35. Id. at 335.
36. Id. at 352.
37. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001).
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corporate scholarship.”38 First, on the “nature and meaning of the
concept of fiduciary duty,” they conclude that “the essence of a
fiduciary relationship is the legal expectation that the fiduciary will
adopt the other-regarding preference function that is the hallmark
of trustworthy behavior.”39 Second, they explain the divergence
between standards of conduct and standards of review40 as follows:
“By articulating a social expectation that directors will exercise due
care, judicial opinions on the duty of care may influence directors’
behavior not so much by changing their external incentives as by
changing their internal preferences.”41 Third, with respect to the role
of trust and cooperation in corporate law, they conclude that “using
legal rules, including contract, to discourage opportunistic behavior
can, in some situations, be not only unnecessary but counterproduc-
tive, increasing the likelihood of the very sort of misbehavior against
which it was intended to protect.”42
Evident throughout the work is a shift in emphasis from the
enforceable legal requirement to the internalized moral duty. In
fact, they define trust as “internalized trust,” which does not include
“calculative behavior motivated by external rewards or sanctions”
of any kind, whether legal, market, or social in nature.43 For them,
internalized trust is “a taste or preference for behaving trustwor-
thily”44—essentially, a moral virtue. To the extent that Blair and
Stout emphasize trust, they deemphasize law.45 This is at least con-
sistent with the aspirational view of fiduciary duties and probably
also an argument against the mandatory view.
38. Id. at 1743.
39. Id.
40. They refer to the “second mystery of corporate law” as “the puzzling relationship
between the corporate director’s duty of care and the business judgment rule.” Id.
41. Id. at 1744.
42. Id. at 1745.
43. Id. at 1750-51; see also id. at 1748-50 (“In this Article, we combine fear of retaliation,
reputational loss, and social sanctions together under the label of market sanctions .... [S]uch
motivations ... rely on a view of people as always strategic, calculating, and self-interested.”
(emphasis omitted)).
44. Id. at 1750.
45. Of course, Blair and Stout do not reject law entirely. In fact, at least with respect to
the duty of loyalty, they argue that fiduciary duties should not be seen as “default rules that
can be freely contracted around.” Id. at 1782.
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B. The Disney Case
The aspirational view of fiduciary duties has not yet worked its
way into the law, but evidence of it can be found in some judicial
opinions. The most important case in which this has happened is
the Disney case. This case has led to many judicial opinions, three
of which are especially relevant to the current discussion. The first,
Brehm v. Eisner, is the first Delaware Supreme Court opinion in the
case;46 the second, In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, is the
chancery court’s opinion after the trial;47 the third, also titled In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, is the Delaware Supreme
Court’s opinion upholding the trial court’s decision.48
The facts of the Disney case are well known and described at
length in the various judicial opinions, so only a brief summary will
be presented here. Michael Eisner was the CEO of Disney.49 The
company was looking for an eventual successor for Eisner, and he
chose his friend, David Ovitz.50 Ovitz’s employment agreement pro-
vided that, if he were terminated without cause, he would receive
essentially the full benefits of his employment contract.51 His
employment with Disney did not work out very well, and, after
only fourteen months, he was terminated without cause.52 As a
result, he received a termination payment in excess of $130 mil-
lion.53 Shareholders sued in a derivative action but were ultimately
unsuccessful.54
Throughout its first opinion in the case, the Delaware Supreme
Court made various statements that reflect the aspirational view.
Perhaps the most noteworthy passage is the following:
This is a case about whether there should be personal liability
of the directors of a Delaware corporation to the corporation for
lack of due care in the decision-making process and for waste of
46. 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
47. 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
48. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006), aff ’g 907 A.2d 693.
49. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 250.
50. Disney, 906 A.2d at 36, 41.
51. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 250.
52. Id. at 249, 252.
53. Disney, 906 A.2d at 35.
54. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 248.
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corporate assets. This case is not about the failure of the
directors to establish and carry out ideal corporate governance
practices.
All good corporate governance practices include compliance
with statutory law and case law establishing fiduciary duties.
But the law of corporate fiduciary duties and remedies for
violation of those duties are distinct from the aspirational goals
of ideal corporate governance practices. Aspirational ideals of
good corporate governance practices for boards of directors that
go beyond the minimal legal requirements of the corporation law
are highly desirable, often tend to benefit stockholders, some-
times reduce litigation and can usually help directors avoid
liability. But they are not required by the corporation law and do
not define standards of liability.55
On its surface, this passage may seem unobjectionable. The court
appears to be saying only that “[a]spirational ideals of good cor-
porate governance practices ... are not required by the corporation
law.”56 This is obviously correct: the law cannot and should not
mandate aspirational ideals. However, closer examination reveals
that the court was doing more than merely stating the obvious.
For example, the court described the “legal requirements of the
corporation law” as “minimal.”57 Clearly, it must have been referring
to the standard of review rather than the more expansive standard
of conduct. Indeed, the court went on to state quite clearly that any-
thing that goes beyond the “standards of liability” may be “highly
desirable,” “benefi[cial],” and “help[ful],” but it is “not required by
the corporation law.”58 In other words, it is merely aspirational.
The significance of these statements is highlighted by the factual
context of the case. The court dismissed the case on the pleadings
even though it elsewhere admitted that this was “potentially a very
troubling case on the merits,” and that, “both as to the processes ...
and the waste test, this [wa]s a close case.”59 For the facts to rep-
resent a “close case” with respect to the standard of review, they
must have represented an easy case with respect to the standard of
55. Id. at 255-56.
56. Id. at 256.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 249.
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conduct. The directors’ conduct, as alleged, was fairly egregious.60
Nevertheless, the court characterized it as a mere failure to comply
with “[a]spirational ideals of good corporate governance practices.”61
Although the court never explicitly stated that fiduciary duty
standards of conduct are merely aspirational, it was obviously of
that opinion.
The plaintiffs in the Disney case were given leave to amend the
pleadings62 and eventually were able to obtain a trial on the
merits.63 Ultimately, the court found in favor of the defendants.64 In
its opinion after the trial, the chancery court also opined on the role
of aspiration in the law of fiduciary duties. Again, the most notewor-
thy passage is the following:
Unlike ideals of corporate governance, a fiduciary’s duties do
not change over time. How we understand those duties may
evolve and become refined, but the duties themselves have not
changed, except to the extent that fulfilling a fiduciary duty
requires obedience to other positive law. This Court strongly
encourages directors and officers to employ best practices, as
those practices are understood at the time a corporate decision
is taken. But Delaware law does not—indeed, the common law
cannot—hold fiduciaries liable for a failure to comply with the
aspirational ideal of best practices, any more than a common-
law court deciding a medical malpractice dispute can impose a
standard of liability based on ideal—rather than competent or
standard—medical treatment practices, lest the average medical
practitioner be found inevitably derelict.
Fiduciaries are held by the common law to a high standard in
fulfilling their stewardship over the assets of others, a standard
that (depending on the circumstances) may not be the same as
that contemplated by ideal corporate governance. Yet therein
lies perhaps the greatest strength of Delaware’s corporation law.
Fiduciaries who act faithfully and honestly on behalf of those
whose interests they represent are indeed granted wide latitude
60. See id. at 267.
61. Id. at 256.
62. Id. at 267.
63. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff ’d, 906 A.2d
27 (Del. 2006).
64. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35-36 (Del. 2006), aff’g 907 A.2d
693.
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in their efforts to maximize shareholders’ investment. Times
may change, but fiduciary duties do not. Indeed, other institu-
tions may develop, pronounce and urge adherence to ideals of
corporate best practices. But the development of aspirational
ideals, however worthy as goals for human behavior, should not
work to distort the legal requirements by which human behavior
is actually measured.65
This language is very different than that of the Delaware Supreme
Court. There is no talk of “minimal legal requirements.”66 To the
contrary, the court acknowledged that fiduciary duties impose a
“high standard,” which “(depending on the circumstances) may not
be the same [standard] as that contemplated by ideal corporate
governance.”67
The aspirational view of fiduciary duties is nevertheless evident
in the court’s opinion. When the court spoke of “the legal require-
ments by which human behavior is actually measured,”68 it was re-
ferring to standards of review. Everything else, including standards
of conduct, is lumped together as “aspirational ideal[s] of best
practices.”69 Although the court “strongly encourage[d] directors and
officers to employ best practices, as those practices are understood
at the time a corporate decision is taken,” it could not “hold fidu-
ciaries liable for a failure to comply with the aspirational ideal of
best practices.”70 Again, this is true even though the court specifi-
cally acknowledged that “there [were] many aspects of [the] defen-
dants’ conduct that fell significantly short of the best practices of
ideal corporate governance.”71 The court clearly believed that stan-
dards of conduct are merely aspirational. When the court asserted
that directors would “be found inevitably derelict”72 if they were held
liable for aspirational ideals, it was suggesting that standards of
conduct are not only unenforceable, but even unachievable.
65. Disney, 907 A.2d at 697-98.
66. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 256.
67. Disney, 907 A.2d at 697.
68. Id. at 698.
69. Id. at 697.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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Moreover, the court made the unnecessary and questionable
assertion that fiduciary duties “do not change over time.”73 Because
the court also said that “the development of aspirational ideals ...
should not work to distort the legal requirements by which human
behavior is actually measured,”74 it seems the court believed that
standards of review do not change over time. If this assertion were
true, it would limit the reach of fiduciary duties considerably. The
context of the assertion is also particularly significant. The court
elsewhere explicitly acknowledged that societal expectations were
changing as a result of the then-recent financial scandals at
companies such as Enron and WorldCom.75 Yet rather than point
out that the conduct in Disney occurred before those scandals and
therefore should not be judged by subsequent standards, the court
insisted that fiduciary duties are unchanging. According to the
court, the ever-increasing societal expectations of directors have no
legal significance. In other words, standards of conduct remain aspi-
rational forever.
On the final appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the trial
court’s decision.76 Its opinion is fundamentally in line with the
others. A particularly noteworthy passage is the following:
In our view, a helpful approach is to compare what actually
happened here to what would have occurred had the committee
followed a “best practices” (or “best case”) scenario, from a pro-
cess standpoint....
Had that scenario been followed, there would be no dispute
(and no basis for litigation) over what information was furnished
to the committee members or when it was furnished. Regretta-
bly, the committee’s informational and decisionmaking process
used here was not so tidy. That is one reason why the Chancellor
found that although the committee’s process did not fall below
the level required for a proper exercise of due care, it did fall
short of what best practices would have counseled.77
73. Id.
74. Id. at 698.
75. Id. at 697.
76. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35-36 (Del. 2006), aff’g 907 A.2d
693 (Del. Ch. 2005).
77. Id. at 56.
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Although the court’s opinion never used the term “aspirational” and
did not explicitly discuss standards of conduct and standards of
review together, the aspirational view is evident throughout. When
the court stated that “the committee’s process did not fall below the
level required for a proper exercise of due care,” it was clearly
referring to the standard of review. When the court said that “the
committee’s process ... f[e]ll short of what best practices would have
counseled” and, elsewhere, that it “fell far short,”78 we can conclude
that it did not satisfy the standard of conduct. The court, unfortu-
nately, went on to say that the directors “breached no duty of care”79
and had performed “adequately.”80 With respect to Eisner’s conduct,
the court used similar language: “Even though the Chancellor found
much to criticize in Eisner’s ‘imperial CEO’ style of governance, ...
in the end, Eisner’s conduct satisfied the standards required of him
as a fiduciary.”81 Obviously, the court believes that standards of
conduct are not mandatory; they are aspirational.
C. Judges Writing Extrajudicially
It is not uncommon for Delaware judges to engage in extrajudicial
scholarship. The extent to which such scholarship should be used as
an interpretive tool to help understand opinions written by such
judges is an interesting question. There is no doubt, though, that
judges writing off the bench can have a significant influence. In this
Section, I will consider the writings of two important judges: the
Honorable Norman Veasey, the former Chief Justice of the Dela-
ware Supreme Court, and the Honorable William Allen, one of the
most highly respected Chancellors in the history of the Delaware
Chancery Court.82
Not surprisingly, Veasey’s extrajudicial writings echo the opinion
he authored for Brehm v. Eisner. For example, he insists that “the
law of corporate fiduciary duties and remedies for violation of those
duties are distinct from the aspirational goals of ideal corporate
78. Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 56, 58, 60, 72.
81. Id. at 73.
82. See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, Delaware as Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor
Cary’s Polemic, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 513 (2000).
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governance practices.”83 Throughout his writings, he is able to go
into greater detail on the matter. On various occasions, he has
written about the divergence between standards of conduct and
standards of review, which he acknowledges “is implied in Delaware
jurisprudence ... but is not well developed in the cases.”84
For Veasey, standards of review are “the standards applied by
courts to determine whether directors will be held liable for wrongdo-
ing,”85 and standards of conduct are “the normative means, or best
practices, by which directors should fulfill their functions.”86
Because standards of conduct do not necessarily lead to liability,87
he often refers to them as aspirational.88 Unlike the trial court in
83. E. Norman Veasey, Should Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate
Governance Practices—or Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2188-89 (2001).
84. E. Norman Veasey with Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware
Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004?, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1416-17 (2005).
85. E. Norman Veasey, Weil Briefing: Corporate Governance, NACD Blue Ribbon
Commission Seeks to Clarify Liability Concerns and Private Preventative Guidance to
Directors, 1543 PRACTICING L. INST.: CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 531, 533
(May 2006); see also Veasey with Di Guglielmo, supra note 84, at 1416 (“Standards of review
... govern whether directors will be held liable or [whether] a transaction [will be] set aside
as a result of particular action or inaction.”).
86. Veasey, supra note 85.
87. Veasey acknowledges that failure to comply with standards of conduct can lead to
liability—if it also amounts to a failure to comply with the standards of review. See, e.g.,
Veasey with Di Guglielmo, supra note 84, at 1436 (“But in some circumstances, an egregious
failure to adhere to certain evolving expectations could result in liability upon the application
of the appropriate standard of review.”). This is because standards of conduct encompass
standards of liability. See Veasey, supra note 85, at 536 (discussing “the distinction between
‘compliance with fiduciary duties’ and ‘best practices of corporate governance’: the latter
includes the former, but the former does not necessarily include the latter”). As Veasey notes,
“standards of conduct ... are defined by Delaware statutory law and judge-made articulations
of fiduciary duties,” Veasey with Di Guglielmo, supra note 84, at 1405, and “include conduct
that is required of directors and aspirations for what is expected of directors,” id. at 1416.
88. See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey, The Challenges for Directors in Piloting Through State
and Federal Standards in the Maelstrom of Risk Management, The Directors’ Academy
Keynote Address, Seattle University (June 4, 2010), in 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) (“The
standards of conduct are aspirational.”); E. Norman Veasey, Musings on the Dynamics of
Corporate Governance Issues, Director Liability Concerns, Corporate Control Transactions,
Ethics, and Federalism, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1008 (2003) [hereinafter Veasey, Musings]
(“Liability may or may not follow a failure to live up to these aspirational standards.”); E.
Norman Veasey, Reflections on Key Issues of the Professional Responsibilities of Corporate
Lawyers in the Twenty-First Century, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 5 (2003) (“Standards of
conduct are the aspirational standards that directors should follow in carrying out their
responsibilities to either manage or direct the management of the corporation’s business and
affairs.”); Veasey with Di Guglielmo, supra note 84, at 1436 (“A priori, these evolving
expectations may be largely aspirational standards of conduct.”). But see Veasey, Musings,
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Disney, however, Veasey acknowledges that there can be some
interaction between standards of conduct and standards of review:
[C]orporate law does, I believe, inform good corporate prac-
tices.... 
The same may be true in reverse. That is, modern trends in
good corporate governance may become such well-established
norms that the failure to follow the trends could conceivably
result in liability in an egregious case. So good corporate practice
may inform corporate law.89
Ultimately, Veasey believes that fiduciary duties are “dynamic, not
static.”90 According to him, “The legal determination whether di-
rectors have acted in accordance with these fiduciary principles may
change as extralegal expectations for directorial conduct change.”91
Veasey generally believes that “[c]odes of best practices ... —not
judicial fiat—are the appropriate intracorporate vehicle” for re-
form.92 Nevertheless, he also believes that “judges can and should
perform a service by speaking out to encourage best corporate
practices that could have a prophylactic benefit in minimizing the
exposure of directors to liability.”93 He has offered a list of seven
suggestions for good corporate practice, but has been explicit in
stating that they are “offered as an aspirational matter only.”94
Chancellor Allen has also expressed opinions consistent with the
aspirational view of fiduciary duties. According to him, the law of
supra, at 1010-11 (“[T]he [exculpation] statute does not eliminate due care as a standard of
conduct, thus leaving it not only as an aspirational goal, but also an expectation. A breach of
the duty of care can be a basis for equitable relief.”).
89. Veasey, supra note 83, at 2189; see also Veasey with Di Guglielmo, supra note 84, at
1436. 
90. Veasey with Di Guglielmo, supra note 84, at 1436. This seems inconsistent with the
Disney chancery court opinion, which stated that fiduciary duties do not change over time. See
supra note 65 and accompanying text. However, one could interpret Veasey’s language as
offering more of a theoretical possibility than a real one: even the short passage above is
liberally sprinkled with qualifiers such as “may,” “could conceivably,” and “in an egregious
case.” Veasey, supra note 83, at 2189.
91. Veasey with Di Guglielmo, supra note 84, at 1439; see also id. at 1436 (“It does seem
obvious to me ... that the expectations of director processes—both by stockholders and
courts— ... continually evolve as business realities and mores change over time. The courts
apply the quintessential common law process to those evolving expectations.”). 
92. Veasey, supra note 83, at 2183.
93. Id. at 2181.
94. Id. at 2190; see also id. at 2190-91.
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fiduciary duties can be seen “as an expression of community ideals
designed to inspire solidarity around certain values.”95 He suggests
that “the duty of care [is] essentially aspirational: informing well-
intentioned persons of what they should be doing in a most general
way.”96 For Allen, this does not render fiduciary duties meaningless.
This is because, Oliver Wendell Holmes’s “bad man” philosophy
notwithstanding,97 people generally “obey law for reasons not fully
accounted for by ... utilitarian calculus.”98 According to Allen, “there
is some virtue to the judicial articulation of nonenforceable stan-
dards of conduct” because “most human beings place value on
thinking of themselves as moral actors who live up to societal
expectations.”99 He concludes that aspirational fiduciary duties can
affect director behavior without an explicit enforcement mechanism.
In two works coauthored with Vice Chancellors Jack B. Jacobs—
later made a Delaware Supreme Court Justice—and Leo E. Strine,
Jr., Allen has also suggested that standards of conduct are aspi-
rational. In two separate articles, when discussing differences
between standards of conduct and standards of review, the authors
refer to standards of conduct, in passing, as “aspirational.”100 The
lack of discussion suggests that they believe the characterization to
be obvious and noncontroversial. At the very least, it can lead the
reader to that conclusion.
95. William T. Allen, The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Duty of Care and the Business
Judgment Rule Under U.S. Corporate Law, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 307,
329 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998).
96. Id.
97. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897) (“If you want to
know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the
material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who
finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions
of conscience.”).
98. Allen, supra note 95, at 329 (emphasis omitted).
99. William T. Allen et al., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with
Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review
Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 460 n.40 (2002); see also Allen, supra note 95, at 330
(“[H]uman actors are not only opportunistic, they are also members of moral communities
with allegiances to moral codes.”).
100. Allen et al., supra note 99, at 460; William T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporate Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1301
(2001).
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II. WHY THE DIVERGENCE?
At the heart of the aspirational view of fiduciary duties—that is,
the theory that standards of conduct are aspirational and unen-
forceable—is the divergence between standards of conduct and
standards of review in corporate law. In order to determine whether
the aspirational view is a sensible interpretation of this divergence,
we must understand why the divergence exists in the first place. In
this Part, I will consider the two main theories that may explain the
divergence. First, I will consider the “acoustic separation” theory,
proposed by Professor Meir Dan-Cohen, which posits that the law
may wish to say different things to different audiences.101 Next, I
will consider what I call the “room-for-error” theory, which provides
the justification for the business judgment rule. I will argue that,
whereas the acoustic separation theory may provide more support
for the aspirational view, the room-for-error theory is more compati-
ble with the mandatory view. Because corporate law has coalesced
around the room-for-error theory, the mandatory view seems a more
appropriate interpretation of the divergence than the aspirational
view.
Before turning to these theories, however, it is worth noting, if
only briefly, the types of reasons that are not given for the diver-
gence. The divergence is not said to exist because of the relative
unimportance of standards of conduct. Neither scholars nor courts
argue that fiduciary duties are relatively unimportant and unwor-
thy of additional enforcement. Nor do they argue that compliance
with standards of conduct is unimportant, or that compliance at the
level of standards of review is all that is necessary. To the contrary,
in a world of never-ending financial crises and scandals, the
importance of good behavior is appreciated all too well. What they
believe is that there are better ways to balance compliance with
other goals than through greater legal enforcement. Of course, if
fiduciary duties were considered relatively insignificant, then the
aspirational view would make perfect sense. The fact that they are
101. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON
GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 430
(Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (cited in Dan-Cohen, supra, at 626-27).
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considered terribly important adds to the credibility of the manda-
tory view.102
A. Acoustic Separation
One possible explanation for the divergence was proposed by Meir
Dan-Cohen.103 Although his particular focus was on criminal law
rather than corporate law, the relevant principles could apply to any
area of law. Dan-Cohen recognizes a distinction between what he
calls “conduct rules” and “decision rules”104—which correspond to
standards of conduct and standards of review, respectively, in cor-
porate law. He argues that, although these types of rules generally
correspond, they need not do so and could diverge.105 The reason
they might diverge, he suggests, is so that the law can say different
things to different audiences. In particular, the law may wish to say
one thing to the general population about the criminal law, and
something different to the courts.106
One example that Dan-Cohen relies upon is the duress defense.107
He suggests that, when the law is speaking to the general popula-
tion, it should emphasize the importance of compliance with the
law; however, when the law is speaking to the courts, it may wish
to make allowances for cases involving duress.108 According to Dan-
Cohen, perhaps the general public should not be informed about this
defense because it might lead to suboptimal resistance to coercion
or to excessive claims of duress.109 Thus, the divergence between
conduct rules and decision rules could lead to maximum compliance
with the law while simultaneously providing for humane excep-
tions.110
102. The view discussed above—that fiduciary duty standards of conduct are unimportant
and unworthy of enforcement—could be called the “irrelevance” theory. It is not discussed
alongside the acoustic separation and room-for-error theories because it has no traction.
103. Dan-Cohen, supra note 101.
104. Id. at 627.
105. Id. at 629.
106. Id. at 630.
107. Id. at 632-34.
108. Id. at 633.
109. See id. at 670.
110. Id. at 633-34.
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The theory of acoustic separation could provide some support for
the aspirational view. It is consistent with the notion that conduct
rules—that is, standards of conduct—are not meant to be enforced
and thus are arguably aspirational. If this were the basis for the
divergence in corporate law, then perhaps the aspirational view
would be on solid ground. However, the theory is deeply problem-
atic.
There are two types of objections to the acoustic separation
theory: one descriptive and one normative. As a descriptive matter,
this theory depends upon an acoustic separation that simply may
not exist. By “acoustic separation,” Dan-Cohen means that the law
would be able to speak to different audiences without each hearing
what the law says to the others.111 Clearly these conditions do not
obtain in reality. Dan-Cohen understands the problem, but argues
that it is plausible to believe that a partial separation exists and
that therefore this justification might retain some validity.112
Personally, I am skeptical that any meaningful acoustic separa-
tion can exist over the long run. In a democratic society, the law
cannot be hidden. The relevant audience eventually will come to
understand the applicable law, at least generally. However, even if
a partial acoustic separation may exist with respect to the general
population and criminal law, it is especially unlikely to obtain with
respect to directors and corporate law. Directors are sophisticated
parties with access to legal counsel. For major transactions and
other situations that are most likely to lead to litigation, directors
generally have the advice of expert counsel. These attorneys are
paid very well to ensure that directors are well informed of their
options under the law. That directors could somehow be uninformed
about standards of review is implausible.113
Dan-Cohen argues that standards of conduct, which are directed
at the general population, are simpler to understand than standards
of review, which are directed at legal experts.114 However, lawyers
111. See id. at 630.
112. See id. at 634-36.
113. For an interesting take on selective transmission, see Lyman Johnson, Counter-
Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and Sinners, Apostles and Epistles, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV.
847, 850 (arguing that, although courts of equity attempt to “preach” to corporate
management, the moral message may be lost when mediated through corporate attorneys).
114. Dan-Cohen, supra note 101, at 652; see also Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 466-67
(hypothesizing the effects of partial acoustic separation on “primary actors”).
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flatter themselves if they believe that only they can understand
the concepts involved. Corporate directors are not simpletons.
Standards of review, moreover, generally are quite simple in
corporate law.115 For example, one of the most basic principles of
corporate law is the business judgment rule—a decision rule which
provides directors with an extraordinary degree of protection from
liability.116 Fairness117 and intentional misconduct118 are not
especially complex, either. Similarly, directors are fully aware of
exculpation charter provisions, which create decision rules that
further limit their exposure to liability.119 It seems likely that
directors often may know more about the standards of review than
about the standards of conduct.120 As a result, it is difficult to believe
that there is any meaningful acoustic separation in corporate law.
The more significant objections to the acoustic separation theory
are normative. Professor Richard Singer has dealt with these issues
extensively.121 For present purposes, I wish to highlight two general
115. At times, corporate law can get sufficiently complex that it would be unreasonable to
expect directors to be aware of all the details. See Allen et al., supra note 100, at 1292
(arguing against “protean growth,” and in favor of simplification, of the corporate law of
fiduciary duties). That is why they hire lawyers. However, as a general matter, corporate law
standards of review tend to be rather simple.
116. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).
117. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
118. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 63-67 (Del. 2006), aff’g 907
A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005).
119. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011).
120. Eisenberg argues that “prudent lawyers who are asked to give advice to clients
concerning a proposed course of action are likely to give advice based on the rules of conduct,
not on the rules of review.” Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 464. This assertion is made without
any supporting evidence, and for a variety of reasons, it does not seem very plausible.
Lawyers, who are conservative by nature, may well urge caution on their clients. However,
limiting discussions with clients to the standards of conduct would be borderline malpractice,
and sophisticated directors would not be content with simplistic answers to difficult questions.
If, as Eisenberg admits, “from the perspective of an actor proposing to engage in certain
conduct, standards of conduct are ‘safe’ rules and standards of review are ‘risky’ rules,” id.,
then directors will want to understand the law so that they, rather than their attorneys, can
decide on how much risk to take. In fact, one of the most basic things that the law of fiduciary
duties requires of directors is that they become informed before making decisions. Thus, it is
extremely unlikely that directors will be willing or able to maintain any meaningful acoustic
separation. As for whether they will be willing to skate close to the standard of review, it is
worth noting that directors, as entrepreneurs by nature, may be less conservative than their
attorneys.
121. Richard Singer, On Classism and Dissonance in the Criminal Law: A Reply to
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considerations. First, although acoustic separation—and the selec-
tive transmission that makes it possible122—may be interesting as
a theoretical construct, it is not desirable for a democratic society.123
As Dan-Cohen himself admits, “[T]he sight of law tainted with
duplicity and concealment is not pretty.”124 Nevertheless, he insists
that acoustic separation does not necessarily depend upon “deliber-
ate, purposeful human action,” or “a conspiracy view of lawmaking
in which legislators, judges, and other decisionmakers plot strate-
gies for segregating their normative communications more effec-
tively.”125 His efforts on this front, though, are halfhearted and not
very convincing. The fact remains that acoustic separation is
normatively very problematic.
Second, acoustic separation is unfair from the perspective of the
actor. According to Dan-Cohen, “When decision rules are more
lenient than relevant conduct rules, as in our duress example, no
one is likely to complain about the frustration of an expectation of
punishment.”126 This assertion is simply wrong. A person who
refuses to succumb to coercion can be expected to complain in
frustration when he learns that he could have relied on the secret
defense of duress.127 Dan-Cohen claims that “[a]n individual who
would not have committed an offense but for his knowledge of the
existence of such a defense” essentially “admits to being the
Holmesian ‘bad man,’ who acts out of fear of legal sanctions rather
than out of deference to his duties,” and suggests that his concerns
do not deserve respect.128 However, this is an oversimplified as-
sessment. People who resist coercion or duress often do so at great
personal cost. Why should they make such sacrifices if society does
not truly expect it of them? The same fairness concerns that
motivate the availability of the defense in the first place suggest
that those to whom it should apply ought to be made aware of its
Professor Meir Dan-Cohen, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 69, 84-100 (1986).
122. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 101, at 634-36. Dan-Cohen defines “selective transmission”
simply as “the transmission of different normative messages to officials and to the general
public.” Id. at 635.
123. Singer, supra note 121, at 86.
124. Dan-Cohen, supra note 101, at 673.
125. Id. at 635.
126. Id. at 634.
127. Singer, supra note 121, at 99.
128. Dan-Cohen, supra note 101, at 671.
544 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:519
existence—and this is true even though others who become aware
of the defense may falsely claim it. Hiding relevant considerations
from actors seems inappropriate. Dan-Cohen suggests that any
calculus as to the costs and benefits of compliance with law is
inappropriate, but does not provide a convincing account of why that
is so.
Regardless of whether one finds the acoustic separation theory
convincing, the fact remains that the theory has not gained much
traction in corporate law. Although it may be discussed, and occa-
sionally approved, by corporate law scholars, it is not relied on very
heavily. More importantly, it has not gained acceptance in the
courts. The next Section considers the justification upon which the
courts and most scholars rely.
Although the acoustic separation theory has not gained any
significant traction, a related theory might seem more respectable.
It is often said that the law of corporate fiduciary duties is ambigu-
ous.129 One could argue that this ambiguity has a positive effect on
compliance: because fiduciaries cannot be sure whether their
conduct will lead to liability, they will be more cautious than they
would in the face of a clear rule.130
This claim must be assessed on both a descriptive and normative
level. Descriptively, we must first ask whether the law of corporate
fiduciary duties can meaningfully be described as ambiguous. There
is widespread agreement that the law is ambiguous, and legal
129. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 894
(1997).
130. See, e.g., Mohsen Manesh, Indeterminacy and Self-Enforcement: A Defense of
Delaware’s Approach to Director Independence in Derivative Litigation, 6 J. BUS. & SEC. L.
177, 197-98 (2006) (“[T]he theoretical risk imposed by indeterminacy promotes a self-policing
norm that will actually reduce litigation and judicial intervention.”); cf. Allen, supra note 129,
at 898 (“Clear, ‘hard and fast’ legal rules ... create[ ] the risk that agents—such as corporate
management—might deploy such well-defined rules cleverly (and technically correctly), but
with the purpose in mind not to advance long-term interests of investors, but to pursue some
different purpose.”); Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition
for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1083 (2000) (“[M]uddy rules can reduce the
incentives to engage in strategic behavior.”); D. Gordon Smith, A Proposal to Eliminate
Director Standards from the Model Business Corporation Act, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1201, 1208-09
(1999) (“[T]he cases implicating the duty of care are so highly contextual that the standard
of conduct is not easily distinguishable from the standard of liability. The two become
conflated in a web of facts, thus permitting judges a wide degree of latitude in future cases,
which in turn encourages directors to exercise high levels of diligence.”).
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scholars generally view this situation very negatively.131 However,
I am skeptical of such claims.132 On the one hand, it seems difficult
to imagine how the law of fiduciary duties could be more precise.
After all, fiduciary duties are essentially matters of equity rather
than law.133 On the other hand, if one is looking for a safe harbor of
sorts,134 then it is difficult to imagine a safer harbor than the one
provided by the business judgment rule.135 A cynic might insist that
the law is clear: directors always win. The cynic would be wrong, of
course, but not necessarily far off the mark. The fact is that direc-
tors generally know exactly how to escape liability; but rather than
play it safe, they often want to push the limits. It is only at the
boundaries that the law is indeterminate—and that, of course, is
unavoidable. Take, for example, the duty of loyalty: if directors
avoid self-dealing, they will not be subject to the entire fairness
test.136 It is only when they insist upon self-dealing that they are
subject to the indeterminacy of having to prove the fairness of their
conduct.137 Hostile takeover situations may be more complicated
because directors cannot avoid the inherent conflict.138 Directors
131. See, e.g., Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1909-10 (1998). See generally Mohsen Manesh,
Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy,
52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 221-24 (2011) (outlining the negative effects of indeterminacy in
Delaware corporate law product, especially on sister states’ law products).
132. Cf. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware’s Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America Buying
an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response to Kahan & Kamar’s Price
Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1280 (2001)
(“[T]he cries of indeterminacy from sophisticated corporate practitioners strike me as
somewhat exaggerated.”).
133. See Uni-Marts, Inc. v. Stein, Nos. 14713, 14893, 1996 WL 466961, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug.
12, 1996) (“[T]he essential fiduciary analysis component of corporation law is not formal but
substantive.”); Speiser v. Baker, 525 A.2d 1001, 1011 (Del. Ch. 1987) (“[O]ur law is the polar
opposite of technical and literal when the fiduciary duties of corporate officers and directors
are involved.”); see also Veasey with Di Guglielmo, supra note 84, at 1413 (“Fiduciary law is
based on equitable principles. Thus, it is both inherently and usefully indeterminate.”).
134. But see, e.g., Kamar, supra note 131, at 1921 (“Delaware law offers no safe harbors,
compliance with which would preclude judicial review and reduce uncertainty.”).
135. See infra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
136. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (“[T]he intrinsic fairness
standard ... will be applied only when the fiduciary duty is accompanied by self-dealing—the
situation when a [fiduciary] is on both sides of a transaction with its [beneficiary].”).
137. See id. A similar analysis could be made with respect to other fiduciary duties. See
infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
138. Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q.
821, 875 (2004).
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could avoid any risk of liability, however, by not resisting the wishes
of the shareholders.139 It is unfair to describe the law as indetermi-
nate under such circumstances. Finally, litigation generally will be
about the gray areas of the law, because few will bother to litigate
a matter that is settled. Looking at the case law in almost any area
will suggest a significant amount of indeterminacy. Perhaps, then,
all law is indeterminate. Accordingly, as a descriptive matter, it is
not fair or meaningful to make the claim about the law of corporate
fiduciary duties in particular.
As a normative matter, we must ask whether ambiguity or
indeterminacy is a good thing. To the extent that the ambiguity is
inescapable, it does not much matter. All that can be done is to note
the good and bad side effects and try to manage them. To the extent
that the ambiguity is intentional, however, the normative issue
becomes more important. In that case, ambiguity becomes almost
indistinguishable from acoustic separation: to keep the law ambig-
uous in order to foster the desired behavior is akin to hiding the law
so that people will act out of ignorance. The same factors that make
acoustic separation distasteful also make ambiguity distasteful; the
difference is simply one of degree. To the extent that corporate law
is ambiguous, it may lead to greater “compliance”—if it may be
called that—but this is not necessarily a good thing.
B. Room for Error
In corporate law, as opposed to legal scholarship, the divergence
between standards of conduct and standards of review is not exactly
a separate doctrine.140 First and foremost, the divergence is the
product of the business judgment rule. The business judgment rule
is one of the most fundamental principles of corporate law.141
139. Under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985), directors
are subject to an intermediate standard of review, as a threshold inquiry, if they engage in
takeover defense. Setting aside the question of whether the standard of review is demanding,
it could be avoided altogether by avoiding takeover defenses. This would leave matters in
shareholders’ hands when the acquirer inevitably conducts a tender offer.
140. Although the two types of standards are dealt with in separate sections under the
Model Business Corporation Act, see §§ 8.30-.31 (2005), neither is explicitly addressed in the
Delaware General Corporation Law. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
141. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-12 (Del. 1984) (“A cardinal precept of the
General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders,
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According to the Delaware courts, “It is a presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company.”142 This
“powerful presumption”143 shields directors’ decisions from review
in all but the most extreme cases.144 In duty of care cases, evidence
of negligence is insufficient to rebut the presumption; plaintiffs
must establish gross negligence.145 In duty of loyalty cases, evidence
of a conflict of interest is insufficient; plaintiffs must establish a
financial or familial conflict that rises to the level of self-dealing.146
In duty of good faith cases, evidence of lack of good faith is insuffi-
cient; plaintiffs must establish intentional misconduct.147 The bus-
iness judgment rule is most powerful in cases challenging the
substance of business decisions. In such cases, evidence of a very
bad decision is insufficient; plaintiffs must establish that the
decision was utterly irrational and amounted to waste.148 Protection
of the business judgment rule is what gives rise to the divergence
between standards of conduct and standards of review.
The judicial defense of the business judgment rule begins with the
language of the corporation statutes,149 which provide that “[t]he
business and affairs of every corporation ... shall be managed by or
manage the business and affairs of the corporation.... The business judgment rule is an
acknowledgement of the managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors under Section
141(a).”), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).
142. Id. at 812.
143. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
144. See id.
145. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
146. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 363 (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812). 
147. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66-67 (Del. 2006), aff’g 907 A.2d
693 (Del. Ch. 2005).
148. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (“Irrationality is the outer limit of the
business judgment rule.” (citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971))).
A fifth category of cases involves structural bias. In such cases, it is insufficient to present
evidence of bias; plaintiffs must show that the decision was unreasonable under the
circumstances. See generally Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in
Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1244-48 (2010).
149. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“Under Delaware law, the
business judgment rule is the offspring of the fundamental principle, codified in 8 Del.C.
§ 141(a), that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under its
board of directors.”), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713
n.54 (Del. 2009).
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under the direction of a board of directors,”150 rather than by the
shareholders who would challenge their decisions or the courts that
would evaluate them.151 It is often noted that business decisions are
inherently risky and should not be subject to second-guessing after
the fact.152 Courts in particular are said to be ill equipped to make
or review business decisions.153 Shareholders, on the other hand, can
be said to have assumed the risk by investing in equity securities.154
150. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011).
151. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (“The business judgment rule exists to protect and
promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors.”);
see also Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) (“[B]y definition the
responsibility for business judgments must rest with the corporate directors; their individual
capabilities and experience peculiarly qualify them for the discharge of that responsibility.”).
152. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982). The Joy court stated,
[C]ourts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to
evaluate corporate business decisions. The circumstances surrounding a
corporate decision are not easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since
business imperatives often call for quick decisions, inevitably based on less than
perfect information. The entrepreneur’s function is to encounter risks and to
confront uncertainty, and a reasoned decision at the time made may seem a wild
hunch viewed years later against a background of perfect knowledge.
Id. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 619-23 (1998).
153. See Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1262 (Conn. 1994) (“Courts
recognize that managers have both better information and better incentives than they.... ‘Not
only do businessmen know more about business than judges do, but competition ... provides
sufficient punishment for businessmen who commit more than their share of business
mistakes.’” (quoting Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986)));
Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263 (“Courts are ill-fitted to attempt to weigh the ‘adequacy’ of
consideration under the waste standard or, ex post, to judge appropriate degrees of business
risk.” (quoting Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997))); Daniels v. Thomas,
Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 367 (Mont. 1990) (“Judges are not business experts and
therefore should not substitute their judgment for the judgment of the directors.”); Auerbach,
393 N.E.2d at 1000 (“[T]he business judgment doctrine, at least in part, is grounded in the
prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped and infrequently called on to evaluate what
are and must be essentially business judgments.”); Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042,
1046 (Pa. 1997) (“[The business judgment] doctrine prevents courts from becoming enmeshed
in complex corporate decision-making, a task they are ill-equipped to perform.”).
154. See Joy, 692 F.2d at 885 (“[S]hareholders to a very real degree voluntarily undertake
the risk of bad business judgment. Investors need not buy stock, for investment markets offer
an array of opportunities less vulnerable to mistakes in judgment by corporate officers.”);
Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“Shareholders don’t
want (or shouldn’t rationally want) directors to be risk averse. Shareholders’ investment
interests ... will be maximized if corporate directors and managers honestly assess risk and
reward and accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted returns available that are
above the firm’s cost of capital.”).
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Therefore, they should not complain when things do not turn out as
hoped.155
Legal enforcement of fiduciary duties exposes directors to the risk
of liability. This can discourage people from serving on boards
because the potential liability would far exceed the compensation
received.156 Exculpation statutes, which helped eliminate liability
for breach of the duty of care, were adopted for this very reason.157
Perhaps even more important, however, is the effect that excessive
liability would have on directors’ business judgment. Because risk
and return are related, shareholders want directors to take appro-
priate business risks. However, if directors face potential liability
when things go wrong, they might well become excessively risk
averse.158 This would have the effect of reducing the rate of return
155. See Joy, 692 F.2d at 885 (“Since shareholders can and do select among investments
partly on the basis of management, the business judgment rule merely recognizes a certain
voluntariness in undertaking the risk of bad business decisions.”); In re Caremark Int’l Inc.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“If the shareholders thought themselves
entitled to some other quality of judgment than such a director produces in the good faith
exercise of the powers of office, then the shareholders should have elected other directors.”).
156. See Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. UAL Corp., 717 F. Supp. 575, 582 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (“It
would be considerably more difficult to recruit directors to serve on corporate boards if their
business decisions were subject to substantive scrutiny. The business judgment rule
encourages competent individuals to become directors who otherwise might decline for fear
of personal liability.” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 897 F.2d 1394 (7th Cir. 1990); Eisenberg, supra
note 1, at 445; Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or
Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 312-13 (1994).
157. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). See generally John L. Reed & Matt
Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of Directors to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and
Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 113-19 (2004); Leo E. Strine, Jr.
et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO.
L.J. 629, 659-63 (2010).
158. See Joy, 692 F.2d at 886 (“[B]ecause potential profit often corresponds to the potential
risk, it is very much in the interest of shareholders that the law not create incentives for
overly cautious corporate decisions.”); Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 n.16 (“If those in charge of
the corporation are to be adjudged personally liable for losses ... based upon what ... persons
of ordinary or average judgment ... regard as ‘prudent[,]’ ‘sensible[,]’ or even ‘rational[,’] such
persons will have a strong incentive at the margin to authorize less risky investment
projects.”); Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052 (“[D]irectors will tend to deviate from this rational
acceptance of corporate risk if in authorizing the corporation to undertake a risky investment,
the directors must assume some degree of personal risk relating to ex post facto claims of
derivative liability for any resulting corporate loss.”); Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 444-46; Lisa
M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through
Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 450 (2005); Gevurtz, supra note 156, at 306.
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that shareholders could expect on their investments.159 Thus, it is in
the interests of both directors and shareholders to reduce the
directors’ exposure to liability.
One important way to do this is to lower the standards of
review.160 Low standards of review give the directors room to make
honest mistakes. With liability reserved for the worst offenders,
directors are free to concentrate on business matters.161 They can
rest assured that, even if they happen to fall short of the standard
of conduct, they likely would remain in compliance with the cor-
responding standard of review—and free from liability.162 The
divergence is a powerful tool that allows directors to pursue the
interests of the corporation and its shareholders aggressively.
The business judgment rule can be characterized as allowing
room for error on the part of honest directors, but it can also be
characterized as allowing room for error on the part of the courts, or
at least compensating therefor.163 If the legal system were perfect,
honest directors would not have to fear liability. Only directors who
were actually negligent or irrational, or engaged in unfair self-
dealing or intentional misconduct, would face liability. Such direc-
tors should be held liable. Because litigation is imperfect, however,
an honest and faithful director might erroneously be considered
negligent or irrational, or to have engaged in unfair self-dealing or
intentional misconduct. The divergence between standards of con-
duct and standards of review can help. Corporate law recognizes
that if fiduciary duties were enforced at the level of standards of
conduct, then imperfect litigation likely would lead to overenforce-
ment of fiduciary duties.164 This would stifle entrepreneurialism and
wealth generation. Underenforcement of fiduciary duties by means
of lowered standards of review solves this problem. Moreover, com-
159. See Fairfax, supra note 158, at 450.
160. See id.
161. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
162. See Allen et al., supra note 99, at 455; Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 464 (“[F]rom the
perspective of an actor proposing to engage in certain conduct, standards of conduct are ‘safe’
rules and standards of review are ‘risky’ rules.”).
163. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 464. 
164. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 99, at 452 (“[E]ven the best of us will occasionally
make a lapse in judgment or a factual error that a judge could later second-guess as
‘unreasonable’ or ‘negligent.’”); Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 444 (“Under a reasonableness
standard of review, ... factfinders might too often erroneously treat decisions that turned out
badly as bad decisions, and unfairly hold directors liable for such decisions.”).
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pensating for the limits of litigation does not simply trade overen-
forcement for underenforcement. Because imperfect litigation likely
would lead to overenforcement of the standard of review, the result
may not be so far from the appropriate level of enforcement for the
standard of conduct.
Assuring directors that they will only be found to have breached
the duty of care if they are grossly negligent provides great comfort.
Of course, mistakes are still possible: directors may wrongly be
found to have acted with gross negligence. That is likely only when
directors were actually negligent, however. It seems highly unlikely
that a director who acted with due care will be found to have been
grossly negligent.165 Directors can feel confident that, as long as they
try to act with due care, they will not be found liable for breach of
the duty of care. The same can be said with respect to the other
fiduciary duties as well. With respect to the duty of loyalty, a court
might wrongly conclude that a director acted unfairly, but only
when there was a conflict of interest. Directors can be confident
that, as long as they avoid conflicts of interest, they will not be held
liable for a breach of the duty of loyalty. With respect to the duty of
good faith, a court might wrongly conclude that a director engaged
in intentional misconduct. However, this seems extremely unlikely
if directors try to conduct themselves above reproach; it seems to be
a risk only when directors decide to engage in questionable dealings.
And, of course, courts might wrongly conclude that a decision was
irrational and amounted to waste. However, the rarity of such
holdings suggests that there is very little to fear on this front.166 A
decision would have to be quite bad indeed to be considered
irrational.167
165. But see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985), overruled on other
grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 n.54 (Del. 2009).
166. “That is ‘an extreme test, very rarely satisfied by a shareholder plaintiff.’” Zupnick v.
Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. Ch. 1997) (quoting Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 13139, 1995
Del. Ch. LEXIS 95, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995)). According to Chancellor Allen in Gagliardi
v. TriFoods International, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051-52 (Del. Ch. 1996), “There is a theoretical
exception ... that holds that some decisions may be so ‘egregious’ that liability for losses they
cause may follow .... The exception, however, has resulted in no awards of money judgments
against corporate officers or directors in this jurisdiction.” But see Fidanque v. Am. Maracaibo
Co., 92 A.2d 311, 321 (Del. Ch. 1952) (“Since the payment ... constitutes an illegal gift of
corporate funds and amounts to waste, ... it is therefore null and void.”).
167. To prove waste, the shareholders bear the burden of establishing that “[the
consideration] the corporation has received is so inadequate in value that no person of
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This, then, is the fundamental justification for the business
judgment rule generally, and for the divergence between standards
of conduct and standards of review specifically: they protect direc-
tors from honest mistakes on their part as well as from inevitable
mistakes on the part of the legal system. This empowers directors
to pursue the interests of the corporation and its shareholders to the
best of their abilities, without excessive fear of liability.
At the heart of the room-for-error theory is a cost-benefit analysis.
Society must weigh the competing values of directorial authority
and accountability.168 In this analysis, the limits of litigation loom
large. Society has concluded that the costs of enforcement often
outweigh the benefits. As Eisenberg put it,
If directors or officers who violate the standards of reasonable-
ness and fairness sometimes escape liability because of a less
demanding standard of review, it is not because they have acted
properly, but because utilizing standards of review that were
fully congruent with the relevant standards of conduct would
impose greater costs than the costs of letting some persons who
violated their standards of conduct escape liability.169
However, the cost-benefit analysis could change over time as dif-
ferent factors shift. If litigation became less imperfect, or if directors
became more malfeasant, the current balance achieved by the bus-
iness judgment rule may become obsolete. The enforcement of
standards of conduct could be appropriate in the future.
The room-for-error theory is more compatible with the mandatory
view than the aspirational view. Although the views are all con-
ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it worth that which the corporation has paid.”
Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988) (quoting Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del.
Ch. 1962)), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253 & n.13 (Del.
2000); see also Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“Roughly, a waste
entails an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately small as to lie
beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to trade.”); Glazer v.
Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176, 183 (Del. Ch. 1993) (“[T]he legal test [for waste] is severe.
Directors are guilty of corporate waste, only when they authorize an exchange that is so one
sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation
has received adequate consideration.”).
168. See E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52
BUS. LAW. 393, 403 (1997) (“The defining tension in corporate governance today is the tension
between deference to directors’ decisions and the scope of judicial review.”).
169. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 467-68.
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sistent in terms of the end result—reduced enforcement of fiduciary
duties—they do not share a common philosophy. Under the aspi-
rational view, standards of conduct are inherently aspirational and
ought not to be enforced. By contrast, the mandatory view would
prefer to enforce standards of conduct and only reluctantly yields on
the issue because of competing values. The room-for-error theory
provides for reduced enforcement because of a cost-benefit analysis.
This seems more compatible with the mandatory view than the
aspirational view. But for the associated costs, standards of conduct
would be enforced.
III. BIFURCATION OR TRIPARTITION?
Without giving it much thought, most people probably assume
that the law of fiduciary duties is bifurcated. On the one hand, there
are standards of conduct; on the other hand, standards of review. It
might seem difficult to imagine how fiduciary duties could be
described otherwise, but there is an alternative schema which is
superior as a descriptive matter.
A bifurcated view of fiduciary duties is not inherently problem-
atic. It highlights an important distinction in the law. However, it
fails to capture some important nuances. The major shortcoming of
bifurcation is that it suggests that the divide is starker than it
needs to be, which can easily lead to an extreme version of bifurca-
tion that is unwarranted. Although there are only two types of
standards in the law of fiduciary duties, they need not be character-
ized as polar opposites. Each standard need not be simply what the
other is not; the two types of standards share many characteristics
and are more similar than different.
In this Part, I will challenge the assumption that bifurcation is
the best way to describe the law of fiduciary duties. First, I will
demonstrate that the aspirational view succumbs to the temptation
of extreme bifurcation. In other words, it not only recognizes a
divergence between standards of conduct and standards of review,
but also describes that divergence in radical terms. Then I will
argue that the divergence actually creates a tripartite division in
the law of fiduciary duties. By establishing two separate thresholds,
the law divides the universe of fiduciary duties into three zones.
This tripartition framework is superior to bifurcation because it
provides additional flexibility and allows for greater nuance.
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A. Bifurcation
To bifurcate means “to divide into two parts or branches.”170 In
one sense, then, it is perfectly fair to say that fiduciary duties are
bifurcated into standards of conduct and standards of review.
However, “mere” bifurcation does not say very much about either
branch. Any set can be bifurcated, regardless of whether it consists
of similar or disparate items. Thus, to say that fiduciary duties are
bifurcated does not tell us how great the divergence is. Only through
“extreme” bifurcation are the items of a set distinguished signifi-
cantly.
By definition, the aspirational view exhibits extreme bifurcation
of fiduciary duties. It not only recognizes the divergence, but also
describes the divergence in radical terms. This is evidenced in the
language its proponents use when discussing standards of conduct
and standards of review. For example, a failure to comply with a
standard of review is accurately considered to be a breach of fidu-
ciary duty. However, proponents of the aspirational view claim that
a failure to comply with a standard of conduct, although not ideal,
is not a breach.171 This is not an inescapable conclusion. Under the
mandatory view, a failure to comply with the standard of conduct
also could be considered a breach of fiduciary duty. Unless there is
also a failure to comply with the standard of review, however, the
plaintiffs cannot establish a breach that would invoke judicial
intervention. Similarly, standards of review are accurately consid-
ered to be enforceable. And yet proponents of the aspirational view
claim that standards of conduct are unenforceable.172 The term
“unenforceable,” although somewhat ambiguous,173 is highly sugges-
170. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 6, at
178.
171. Throughout its final opinion in the Disney case, the Delaware Supreme Court
acknowledged Eisner’s shortcomings, yet insisted that he had not breached his fiduciary
duties. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
172. Rock & Wachter, supra note 21, at 1622 (“[T]he raison d’être of firms is to replace legal
governance of relations with nonlegally enforceable governance mechanisms.”).
173. The term “unenforceable” means “unable to be enforced.” However, this inability could
be a contextual inability, limited to specific circumstances, such as current law, or an absolute
inability, based on the nature of things. In this context, therefore, unenforceable could mean
not subject to enforcement under current law, but it could also mean intrinsically incapable
of being enforced. Even if an author intends the former meaning, it could easily be interpreted
to mean the latter. Most likely, the issue is never given much thought, allowing the
suggestion of the latter meaning to linger.
2012] CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES 555
tive of an impossibility of enforcement—or at least of the inappropri-
ateness thereof. Under the mandatory view, standards of review are
simply unenforced, but potentially enforceable. Finally, standards
of review are accurately considered to be mandatory. However,
proponents of the aspirational view claim that standards of conduct
are aspirational.174 Again, the term “aspirational” is highly sugges-
tive of optionality, and possibly even unachievability.175 Under the
mandatory view, standards of conduct remain mandatory and
binding upon actors, even if they are unenforced. In short, the aspir-
ational view sets up a divide that is quite extreme. By maximizing
the significance of the divergence between the two types of stan-
dards, the aspirational view minimizes the significance of the
standards of conduct.
Proponents of the aspirational view often go beyond the extreme
bifurcation that is inherent in the aspirational view itself. If the law
of fiduciary duties is bifurcated, then one would expect both
standards of review and standards of conduct to be considered law,
and distinct from that which is not law. However, proponents of the
aspirational view often distinguish standards of review from
everything else, lumping standards of conduct together with
nonlegal forces. Sometimes, they even go so far as to suggest that
standards of conduct are not law at all.
The most pronounced example can be found in the work of
Professors Rock and Wachter.176 Indeed, their entire focus is on the
distinction between that which is legally enforceable—that is,
standards of review—and what they call NLERS, or “nonlegally
enforceable rules and standards.”177 Rock and Wachter’s concept of
NLERS extends beyond fiduciary duty standards of conduct pre-
cisely because the relevant issue for them is legal enforcement. In
other words, the difference between “legal and nonlegal enforce-
ability” is the difference between “‘law’ and ‘norms.’”178 Thus,
174. See supra Part I.
175. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
177. Rock & Wachter, supra note 21, at 1623.
178. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1607, 1611 (2001). At one point, the authors state their view that “NLERS are ... understood
to impose obligations, but without legal enforcement.” Rock & Wachter, supra note 21, at
1641. However, they are not using the term “obligation” in the same sense as the mandatory
view. What they mean is any type of moral or social obligation in the sense of “rules and
standards” as opposed to “mere behavioral regularities.” Id. They do not mean to suggest a
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standards of conduct are relegated to the same status as any other
norms or NLERS.
Another pronounced example of this extreme bifurcation can be
found in the work of Professors Hill and McDonnell.179 Not unlike
Rock and Wachter, their main distinction is between “law on the
books and as enforced”180 and “extra-legal forces ... that extend[ ]
Delaware corporate law significantly.”181 The former category, which
includes standards of review, is described as “[l]aw, in its traditional
sense.”182 The latter category, which they call the “penumbra,”
essentially relegates standards of conduct to dictum and then lumps
them together with all other “voices ... in the corporate governance
debate.”183 Although their goal is not to undermine fiduciary duties,
but rather to extend the reach of corporate law, they clearly view
standards of conduct as having more in common with nonlegal
influences than with standards of review.
This extreme bifurcation is also evident in the legal opinions for
the Disney case. For example, the Delaware Supreme Court distin-
guished between “the law of corporate fiduciary duties and remedies
for violation of those duties” on the one hand and “the aspirational
goals of ideal corporate governance practices” on the other.184 It
described the former as “minimal legal requirements” and the latter
as “highly desirable” but “not required.”185 The court did not even
bother to distinguish fiduciary duty standards of conduct from other
aspirational goals, and it is not at all clear that it perceived any
such distinction. In a later opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court
similarly distinguished between “best practices” on the one hand
and “the level required for a proper exercise of due care” on the
other hand.186 Likewise, the court of chancery distinguished between
“ideals of corporate governance” on the one hand and “a fiduciary’s
duties” on the other.187 The former are “aspirational,” “worthy as
legal obligation.
179. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
180. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 26, at 335.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 352.
183. Id. at 336.
184. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000).
185. Id.
186. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 56 (Del. 2006), aff’g 907 A.2d 693
(Del. Ch. 2005).
187. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906
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goals for human behavior,” and “strongly encourage[d]” by the
courts,188 but “should not work to distort the legal requirements.”189
The latter are “legal requirements by which human behavior is
actually measured”190 and “do not change over time.”191 Again, the
court never clearly indicated whether there is a distinction between
fiduciary duty standards of conduct and aspirational ideals of
corporate governance. Given that the language of the divergence is
well known in corporate law, this omission strongly suggests that
any difference is, at best, irrelevant.
In his extrajudicial writings, Veasey also distinguishes between
“the law of corporate fiduciary duties and remedies for violation of
those duties” on the one hand and “the aspirational goals of ideal
corporate governance practices” on the other.192 Those “aspirational
goals” are standards of conduct,193 and they do not seem to comprise
“the law of corporate fiduciary duties.”194 They are only what a direc-
tor should do.195 Again, it does not seem to be relevant for Veasey to
distinguish standards of conduct that are considered fiduciary
duties from those that are not.
In fairness, this extreme bifurcation is often implicit rather than
explicit, and in some cases may not have been intended by the
author. Nevertheless, it is important to draw this out. My concern
is not so much about what particular scholars or judges believe;
rather, it is about how what they say can influence the development
of the law. My point is that the aspirational view tends to exhibit an
extreme form of bifurcation that maximizes the divide between
standards of conduct and standards of review. As I will show in the
A.2d 27.
188. Id. at 697-98.
189. Id. at 698.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 697.
192. Veasey, supra note 83, at 2188-89.
193. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
194. At times, Veasey seems to say that standards of conduct are not fiduciary duties at
all. For example, one of the headings for a section in which he discusses the divergence is
labeled, “Fiduciary Duties, Not Aspirational Standards of Conduct, Establish Standards of
Liability.” Veasey, supra note 85, at 536.
195. In fairness, Veasey would say that standards of conduct can sometimes lead to liability
and therefore are not always “merely” aspirational. However, this is true only when standards
of conduct overlap standards of review. For Veasey, when the two do not overlap, standards
of conduct are aspirational. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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next Section, this is not the only way to interpret the divergence,
nor is it the best way.
B. Tripartition
Although it may seem obvious to assume that the divergence
between standards of conduct and standards of review leads to
bifurcation, this is not the best interpretation. As a schema, bifur-
cation assumes that the divergence creates two zones: one for the
standard of conduct and another for the standard of review.
However, these two standards should not be viewed as zones.196
Rather, they should be understood as thresholds.197 If there are two
196. If each standard is imagined as a zone, as shown in Diagram 1, then things get rather
complicated. Although one might think that each zone labeled represents compliance with the
titular standard, it actually represents lack of compliance. For example, if the “standard of
review” zone represents the zone of legal enforcement, then it must comprise conduct that
fails to satisfy the standard of review. (Conduct that barely satisfies the standard of review
actually fails to satisfy the standard of conduct.) Logically, therefore, the “standard of
conduct” zone should represent lack of compliance with the standard of conduct. This leads
to the realization that a third zone is necessary in order to represent compliance with the
standard of conduct—that is, aspirational ideals. See infra notes 199, 201 and accompanying
text. (Alternatively, if each zone is determined to represent compliance with its titular
standards, there is still a need for a third zone to represent lack of compliance with the
standard of review, which can lead to legal enforcement.) In order to insist upon bifurcation,
the standard of conduct zone must represent compliance with the standard of review without
reference to the standard of conduct. In other words, it must represent both standards of
conduct and aspirational ideals.
197. The suggestion that standards should be imagined as thresholds rather than zones
is hardly novel. In ordinary discourse, we generally refer to standards as creating thresholds
for behavior. For example, we say that one must exercise a certain amount of care to avoid
negligence, and another amount of care to avoid gross negligence. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,
254 (Del. 2000). In terms of fairness, we say there must be a certain amount, or type, of
process to achieve fair dealing, and a certain level of substance to achieve fair price. See, e.g.,
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). In terms of good faith, misconduct
becomes actionable when it is intentional. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,
906 A.2d 27, 62-68 (Del. 2006), aff’g 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005). And the demanding nature
of the waste test means that the threshold for substance is set very low. See id. at 74.
One might argue that fairness is sometimes characterized as a zone, as when people speak
of a “range of fairness.” See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 869, 877 (Del. 1985),
overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 n.54 (Del. 2009); In re
Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 619, 622 (Del. Ch. 2005); see also
Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 450 (“In many contracts fairness is a range, rather than a point.”).
However, this is merely a colloquialism that suggests that the threshold cannot be determined
easily or mechanically and requires flexibility and judgment. In fact, fairness remains a
threshold, albeit a fuzzy or uncertain one. That it is not truly a “range” is evidenced by the
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thresholds, then there are three zones. For this reason, it is more
appropriate to speak of the tripartition of the law of fiduciary duties
rather than its bifurcation. The diagram below illustrates my argu-
ment.
DIAGRAM 1
The first zone represents a failure to satisfy—that is, a failure to
meet the threshold for—the standard of review. This is the zone of
legal enforcement of fiduciary duties. In Disney’s terms, it is the
realm of “personal liability” and “remedies for violation.”198 Here, a
plaintiff should be able to establish a breach of fiduciary duty,
making labels such as “mandatory” and “enforceable” uncontrover-
sial.
The second zone represents compliance with the standard of
review, but failure to satisfy the standard of conduct. Bifurcation
overlooks this, or at least fails to do it justice. Because standards of
conduct are as much a part of the law of fiduciary duties as are
standards of review, this zone is equally mandatory. Failure to sat-
isfy the standard of conduct should be considered a breach. Legal
fact that there is no upper limit: surely a court would not find unfairness because of excessive
process or generous price!
198. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 255-56.
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enforcement is not an option, however: a breach of fiduciary duty
cannot be established for purposes of litigation because the conduct
in question satisfies the standard of review. Thus, this is the zone
of the “unenforced duty.”
The third zone represents compliance with—that is, exceeding the
threshold for—both standards of review and standards of conduct.
Because all fiduciary duties have been satisfied, there is no breach.
Conduct in this zone may be praiseworthy,199 but it is never mand-
atory. This is the zone of aspirational ideals. Standards of conduct
that are part of a fiduciary’s duties do not belong here.
In order to illustrate the three zones more fully, I will use the
duty of care as an example. The first threshold, the standard of
review, is gross negligence. The second threshold, the standard of
conduct, is negligence.200 The first zone, legal enforcement, repre-
sents a failure to satisfy the standard of review. Conduct in this
zone is grossly negligent. The second zone, unenforced duty, rep-
resents a satisfaction of the standard of review but not of the
standard of conduct. Conduct in this zone is negligent. The third
zone, aspirational ideals, represents satisfaction of the standard of
conduct. Conduct in this zone might be described as careful.201
The difference between bifurcation and tripartition is clear. There
is no difference between the two views in how they handle stan-
dards of review. The difference lies in how they handle standards of
conduct and aspirational ideals. Whereas tripartition deals with
them separately, bifurcation seems to lump them together. Thus,
tripartition is a more robust framework. It offers more flexibility
and allows for greater nuance.
To be fair, it is not bifurcation that is the problem, but extreme
bifurcation. Technically speaking, fiduciary duties are bifurcated
into standards of conduct and standards of review. However, this
bifurcation describes only law, and not that which is not law. In
other words, bifurcation cannot explain aspirational ideals. As long
199. Not all conduct that exceeds the requirements of law is praiseworthy. It is possible to
be excessive. For example, too much care may stifle appropriate entrepreneurial risk. This
would unduly compromise success and profitability and would not be considered desirable. For
purposes of this Article, I will ignore conduct that is excessive in this sense. Although I do not
mean to suggest that the risk is insignificant, it is not relevant to the current discussion.
200. See supra notes 2, 145 and accompanying text.
201. Of course, this zone also includes conduct that may be described as excessively careful
and therefore suboptimal. See supra note 199.
2012] CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES 561
as this limitation is recognized, there should be no problem with
bifurcation. The problem arises when one tries to blur the distinc-
tion between standards of conduct and aspirational ideals.
The aspirational view wrongly assumes that bifurcation explains
everything. As a result, it sees only the two extremes—mandatory
duties and aspirational ideals. It then assumes that these two
extremes correspond to the two types of standards—standards of
review and standards of conduct, respectively. In doing so, it fails to
account for the unenforced duty and simply collapses the concept
into aspirational ideals.
Tripartition, on the other hand, can easily accommodate both
unenforced duties and aspirational ideals. Although aspirational
ideals are not themselves fiduciary duties, they are an important
part of the fiduciary duty landscape. The ability to accommodate the
distinction between standards of conduct and aspirational ideals is
an advantage that tripartition has over bifurcation. It allows for the
preservation of nuance that bifurcation has difficulty capturing. The
only way for bifurcation to deal with aspirational ideals is either to
acknowledge that it cannot encompass them or to insist that they
are indistinguishable from standards of conduct. The first approach
is not particularly helpful; the second is actually harmful.
Bifurcation suggests a false dichotomy: that standards of review
are law and that standards of conduct are not.202 The law of fidu-
ciary duties is significantly more nuanced. The ability to deal with
a third category that is not actually law is what makes tripartition
better at understanding the law as a practical matter. The inability
to do so leads bifurcation to error.
IV. STANDARDS OF CONDUCT ARE NOT MERELY ASPIRATIONAL
In Part III, I argued that tripartition is a better framework for
understanding the law of fiduciary duties than is the more common
view of bifurcation. Tripartition is superior because it provides more
flexibility and allows for greater nuance, especially in distinguishing
between unenforced duties and aspirational ideals. In this Part, I
will defend tripartition and the mandatory view more fully. First, I
will argue that standards of conduct are not inherently aspirational.
Far from being unachievable, they are entirely mundane and per-
202. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 256.
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fectly capable of being enforced. Next, I will argue that the concept
of unenforced duties is a meaningful one and distinct from aspir-
ational ideals. This is because people obey the law for many
different reasons, and not simply out of fear of punishment. Finally,
I will argue that standards of conduct are not necessarily unen-
forced duties, as I have assumed thus far, but possibly underen-
forced duties. If this is true, it blurs the distinction between
standards of conduct and standards of review. The two types of
standards are different in degree rather than kind.
A. Are Standards of Conduct Aspirational?
In this Section, I argue that fiduciary duty standards of conduct
are not inherently aspirational. Far from being unachievable, they
are entirely mundane and capable of being enforced. First, I will
demonstrate that, although the courts sometimes use lofty language
to describe fiduciary duties, the leading cases do not suggest the
contrary. Then I will show that common formulations of fiduciary
standards of conduct are not very lofty at all.
Most of the lofty language upon which courts and scholars rely
stems from a handful of frequently-cited opinions that have been
very influential. The two most important opinions are from the
cases of Meinhard v. Salmon203 and Guth v. Loft, Inc.204 A brief
examination will demonstrate that such opinions are not nearly as
problematic as they are made to seem.
Consider, first, the case of Meinhard. In that case, there were two
coadventurers, treated essentially as partners, who had leased and
were operating a hotel.205 Meinhard was an investor only, whereas
Salmon was also the manager. As the term of the lease—and the
partnership—came to an end, Salmon negotiated for himself alone
an extension and expansion of the lease. When Meinhard learned of
this, he demanded to be included and sued Salmon for breach of the
duty of loyalty. The New York Court of Appeals viewed the case as
involving a “corporate opportunity,” and Meinhard prevailed.206
203. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
204. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
205. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 545-46.
206. Id. at 546-49.
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More interesting than either the facts or the holding of the case
is the language that the court used when discussing fiduciary
duties. The following passage in particular is of perennial interest:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while
the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many
forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary
ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of
the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to
this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of
undivided loyalty by the “disintegrating erosion” of particular
exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries
been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It
will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.207
This is one of the most celebrated passages of its kind. It discusses
fiduciary duties in very lofty and grandiose terms. The modern
reader easily might interpret this passage more broadly than likely
was intended. Taken in context, however, it is not saying nearly as
much as might be supposed.
Clearly the passage contains some very lofty language. The court
spoke of “the duty of the finest loyalty” and “[n]ot honesty alone, but
the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”208 However, seemingly
hidden in the passage are various statements that are surprisingly
mundane. For example, the court said that “[a] trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place” and that
“the level of conduct for fiduciaries [has] been kept at a level higher
than that trodden by the crowd.”209 Given that at common law, the
“morals of the market place” amounted to little more than a pro-
hibition against fraud,210 the higher standard to which fiduciaries
207. Id. at 546 (citation omitted).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., In re Auto Specialties Mfg. Co., 153 B.R. 457, 488-89 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1993) (discussing phrase “morals of the marketplace” as prohibiting only “egregious conduct,”
“fraud,” and “conduct [that] shock[s] the conscience”); In re Sleepy Valley, Inc., 93 B.R. 925,
933 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988); John Bourdeau et al., 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 205 (2012);
Timothy A. French, The Rise and Fall of the Doctrine of Equitable Subordination as Applied
564 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:519
are held is not necessarily very high at all. Rather than taking
particular statements out of context, we should read them all
together, consistently if possible. This is not as difficult as it seems.
When interpreting the loftier statements, we need to consider the
intended baseline. If one supposes that the baseline was the faithful
fiduciary, then the lofty language would seem to be pushing
fiduciary duties to ever-greater heights. However, if the baseline is
only market participants, then these passages are doing little more
than saying that fiduciaries are held to a higher standard. The
former interpretation, which is admittedly quite common, leaves the
passage with something of a schizophrenic feel. The latter interpre-
tation harmonizes the various statements, which suggests that it is
the appropriate one.
The court used similar lofty language at various points through-
out the opinion. Among the more powerful passages are the
following: “Equity refuses to confine within the bounds of classified
transactions its precept of a loyalty that is undivided and unself-
ish”;211 “Salmon had put himself in a position in which thought of
self was to be renounced, however hard the abnegation”;212 “For
[Salmon] and for those like him the rule of undivided loyalty is
relentless and supreme.”213 Once again, it is easy for the reader to
misinterpret these passages. It would be wrong, however, to give
these statements a maximum interpretation. Surely the court did
not mean to say quite so much. After all, the loyalty of partners is
never truly “undivided and unselfish.” Partners are to seek their
mutual benefit, rather than the exclusive benefit of the others. It
is not the case that “thought of self was to be renounced.” What
these passages are trying to say, in admittedly grandiose terms, is
that partners cannot ignore each other’s interests and must treat
each other fairly, perhaps even beyond reproach. Otherwise, the
court’s suggestion that Salmon may have been able to satisfy his
fiduciary duties to Meinhard merely by disclosing the opportunity
to Nonmanagement Creditors, 4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 257, 288 (1995) (implying that the
“morals of the marketplace” permit conduct other than fraud or breach of contract).
211. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 548.
212. Id.
213. Id.
2012] CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES 565
to him and giving him the opportunity to compete for it214 is difficult
to reconcile.
In the end, the case is a fairly typical corporate opportunity case.
One partner took an opportunity that the court believed belonged to
the partnership, and this was found to be a breach of the duty of
loyalty.215 What is noteworthy about the case is not so much the
lofty dictum, which is easily exaggerated, but the remedy. Despite
the termination of the partnership by its own terms, Salmon was
forced to share a much larger opportunity and for a much longer
duration than ever anticipated.216 Although this might strike some
as excessive, it is a problem of remedies, not a problem with the
standard of conduct or the standard of review.
The Guth case is actually very similar. In that case, Guth was a
shareholder and officer of Loft.217 He was accused of using the com-
pany to develop a side business which he then took for himself.218
The court found Guth to have breached his duty of loyalty and
required him to transfer the business opportunity to Loft.219
The most celebrated passage from the opinion is the following:
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their
position of trust and confidence to further their private interests.
While technically not trustees, they stand in a fiduciary relation
to the corporation and its stockholders. A public policy, existing
through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of
human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that
demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and
inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only
affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation commit-
ted to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that
would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or
advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to it,
214. On this issue, the court is noncommittal: “He might have warned Meinhard ... that
either would be free to compete for the award. If he had done this, we do not need to say
whether he would have been under a duty, if successful in the competition, to hold the lease
so acquired for the benefit of a venture then about to end.” Id. at 547. However, this reticence
is understandable. After all, Salmon might have had an unfair advantage in the opportunity
arising from his position in the partnership.
215. Id. at 549.
216. See id. at 548-49.
217. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 504-05 (Del. 1939).
218. Id. at 506.
219. Id. at 515.
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or to enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of
its powers. The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish
loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict
between duty and self-interest. The occasions for the determina-
tion of honesty, good faith and loyal conduct are many and
varied, and no hard and fast rule can be formulated. The
standard of loyalty is measured by no fixed scale.220
Again, the court used some language that seems very lofty. If the
language in this passage is given the strongest interpretation that
the words will bear, then fiduciary duties would rightly be consid-
ered not only aspirational and unenforceable, but perhaps even
unachievable. After all, it would be humanly impossible for each
director and officer always “to refrain from doing anything that
would ... deprive [the corporation] of profit or advantage which his
skill and ability might properly bring to it, or enable it to make.”221
By way of hyperbolic example, any sort of rest would violate this
standard! Surely, the court was suggesting nothing so fanciful.
In fact, read carefully, the language in this passage is not extra-
ordinary. Although the court spoke of “the most scrupulous obser-
vance of [a fiduciary’s] duty,”222 that does not tell us anything about
what that duty entails. The court also spoke of “an undivided and
unselfish loyalty.”223 Because the context is a corporation rather
than a partnership, it is possible to read this statement literally.224
The court, however, specified what it meant: “[T]hat there shall be
no conflict between duty and self-interest.”225 Nothing is special
about this statement because avoiding conflicts of interest has
always been the core of the duty of loyalty. Although that remains
220. Id. at 510.
221. Id. (emphasis added).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Unlike a partner, who is both an agent and a principal of a partnership, see Latta v.
Kilbourn, 150 U.S. 524, 543 (1893), an officer is only an agent of a corporation. Therefore, an
officer does not need the ability to think of his own interests and can be expected to act
entirely on behalf of the corporate principal.
225. Guth, 5 A.2d at 510. Although the court claimed that the duty of loyalty is “inveterate
and uncompromising in its rigidity,” id., it also undermined this strong claim when it
conceded that “[a]s a general proposition it may be said that a corporate officer or director is
entirely free to engage in an independent, competitive business, so long as he violates no legal
or moral duty with respect to the fiduciary relation that exists between the corporation and
himself,” id. at 514.
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true to this day, the law has since changed to provide corporate
fiduciaries with the ability to work around many conflicts of
interest.226 This development must be kept in mind when the lofty
language of older opinions is considered.
Looking beyond a few lofty passages, such as the one quoted
above, reveals an opinion that is quite reasonable. This is a cor-
porate opportunity case, and the court provided a framework for
addressing such situations:
[I]f there is presented to a corporate officer or director a business
opportunity which the corporation is financially able to under-
take, is, from its nature, in the line of the corporation’s business
and is of practical advantage to it, is one in which the corpora-
tion has an interest or a reasonable expectancy, and, by embrac-
ing the opportunity, the self-interest of the officer or director will
be brought into conflict with that of his corporation, the law will
not permit him to seize the opportunity.227
This “test” is not very well formulated. Technically, it is neither a
standard of conduct nor a standard of review. It is an attempt to
define the term “corporate opportunity,” which the duty of loyalty
prevents fiduciaries from taking for their own benefit. Although it
sets forth various factors to consider, it does not suggest how the
factors should be weighed.228 Nevertheless, each of the factors is
perfectly reasonable, and neither lofty nor unachievable.
Like Meinhard, Guth is a straightforward corporate opportunity
case. Nothing is especially noteworthy about the facts or the
holding. At most, one might take issue with the remedy, but not
with the standards that were applied.
In short, the language in cases such as Meinhard and Guth is not
quite so lofty as is commonly believed. To the extent that it is lofty,
it should be considered dictum rather than a standard of conduct. In
each case, it is possible to go beyond the lofty language and find a
226. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2011). See generally Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors
Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35 (1966).
227. Guth, 5 A.2d at 511.
228. Read literally, the quoted language seems to suggest that all the elements must be
satisfied in order to establish a corporate opportunity. However, in a subsequent passage, the
court seemed to suggest that there is a corporate opportunity if any of the factors are present.
See id. at 510-11. In fact, neither interpretation is correct. The court merely listed factors that
must be considered.
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core of perfectly manageable legal standards. In each case, the stan-
dard of conduct seems to be the avoidance of conflicts of interest,
and the standard of review something along the lines of fairness.
Although the lofty language might be considered aspirational, these
familiar standards should be considered law.
Even if one is not persuaded, he nevertheless must admit that
fiduciary duty standards of conduct, as typically articulated by the
courts, are not nearly so lofty. It is not only possible to have stan-
dards of conduct that are capable of being enforced, it is in fact the
case today. The standards of conduct for each of the main fiduciary
duties229 are not only enforceable, but as a practical matter, are not
even particularly demanding.
Consider first the duty of care. In Delaware, “directors of a cor-
poration in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use that
amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use
in similar circumstances.”230 Under the Model Business Corporation
Act, directors must “discharge their duties with the care that a
person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under
similar circumstances.”231 These formulations, and others like them,
articulate what is essentially an ordinary care standard—that is,
avoid negligence. Nothing is inherently aspirational or unenforce-
able about this. Negligence is the relevant standard in tort law, and
it is enforced in most contexts without much difficulty. In other
words, the standard of conduct for the duty of care is entirely unex-
ceptional.
Articulating the correct standard of conduct for the duty of loyalty
is a bit more challenging. The duty of loyalty focuses on conflicts of
interest.232 One may be tempted to say simply that directors must
avoid conflicts of interest altogether. Although this may have been
the law at one time,233 it seems difficult to maintain today in the
face of laws that specifically permit conflict of interest transactions
229. Fiduciary duties can be understood at various levels of abstraction. See Claire A. Hill
& Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1769, 1788-91 (2007). As a result, the question of how many fiduciary duties there are
in corporate law—and which ones should be considered the “main” ones—is both misleading
and irrelevant. See Velasco, supra note 148, at 1235-36.
230. Graham ex rel. S’holders of Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188
A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
231. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2005).
232. Guth, 5 A.2d at 510.
233. See Marsh, supra note 226, at 36-39.
2012] CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES 569
under certain circumstances.234 Eisenberg has argued that the
standard of conduct, like the standard of review, is fairness in the
face of conflicts.235 This seems to capture the essence of loyalty in
the modern corporate setting. At its broadest, the standard of
conduct could be said to require that directors act in the interests of
the corporation and its shareholders, as opposed to their own
interests or someone else’s.236 Such broad language should not
suggest that the concern is altruism or selflessness, however.237
Interpreted properly, it simply requires fairness in the face of any
conflict of interest. As such, it is not problematic. It cannot be said
to be unenforceable, because fairness is also the standard of re-
view,238 and it cannot be considered unachievable, because fairness
does not require perfection.239
The duty of good faith has received serious attention only
recently. As of yet, no single orthodox formulation for the standard
of conduct exists. However, broadly speaking, it could be said to re-
quire honesty, decency, and compliance with law.240 These standards
234. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
235. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 451. Eisenberg also argued that there is no divergence
in the duty of loyalty. Id. at 450-51, 464-65. As I have argued in previous work, however, this
latter assertion seems incorrect: “[T]he standard of review is significantly more limited than
the standard of conduct in that it focuses primarily, if not exclusively, on financial conflicts
that rise to the level of self-dealing.” Velasco, supra note 148, at 1243.
236. Although the duty of loyalty generally focuses on financial conflicts of interest, it also
extends to related considerations. Thus, courts ask whether directors are disinterested and
independent. In order to be considered disinterested, “directors can neither appear on both
sides of a transaction nor expect to derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense
of self-dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders
generally.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000). In order to be considered independent, “a
director’s decision [must be] based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board
rather than extraneous considerations or influences.” Id. at 816. The formulation of the
standard of conduct in the text reflects these twin concerns.
237. Cf. Velasco, supra note 148, at 1257-77 (discussing semantic differences between
loyalty and good faith).
238. But see supra notes 3, 235 and accompanying text (describing how fairness as a
standard of review is applied with limitations).
239. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1179 (Del. 1995) (“A finding of
perfection is not a sine qua non in an entire fairness analysis.”); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983) (“[P]erfection is not possible, or expected.”).
240. Eisenberg’s articulation of the standard of conduct for the duty of good faith is as
follows:
The duty of good faith in corporate law is comprised of a general baseline
conception and specific obligations that instantiate that conception. The baseline
conception consists of four elements: subjective honesty, or sincerity;
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are by no means unachievable. They are not even particularly
demanding: Although they may seem rather idealistic at first,
further reflection reveals that they are common virtues. Ordinary
people regularly act in good faith in their everyday lives. Nor are
they inherently unenforceable. “Subjective honesty”241 may be dif-
ficult to administer as an evidentiary matter, but this is true of
many legal standards, particularly those that deal with mens rea.
Thus, good faith could be enforced if the law were so inclined.
In previous work, I have argued that it may be best to say that
there are five fiduciary duties.242 In addition to care, loyalty, and
good faith, there are also duties of objectivity and rationality.243
Under the duty of objectivity, directors must not yield to the
temptations of structural bias.244 This duty is similar in many
respects to the duty of loyalty, and likewise, is not aspirational or
unenforceable. Under the duty of rationality, directors must make
good business decisions. In this context, “good decisions” means
well-reasoned and defensible decisions rather than decisions leading
to good outcomes.245 Again, this is not merely aspirational, and it is
not unenforceable.
Of course, standards of conduct are not enforced in corporate
law.246 Instead, there are divergent standards of review, which
enforce fiduciary duties at a much lower level. To the duty of care,
nonviolation of generally accepted standards of decency applicable to the conduct
of business; nonviolation of generally accepted basic corporate norms; and
fidelity to office. Among the specific obligations that instantiate the baseline
conception are the obligation not to knowingly cause the corporation to disobey
the law and the obligation of candor even in non-self-interested contexts.
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5
(2006). Although my list is shorter, it is intended to be essentially the same. By “honesty,” I
mean both “subjective honesty” and “fidelity to office,” which could be considered objective
honesty. See id. at 25 (“Fidelity to one’s office means an attempt to execute an office, and the
role that the office implicates, in the manner in which execution of the office is reasonably to
be expected.”). By “decency,” I mean “nonviolation of generally accepted standards [and] basic
corporate norms.” Id. at 5. By “compliance with law,” I mean “not to knowingly cause the
corporation to disobey the law.” Id.
241. See supra note 240.
242. See Velasco, supra note 148, at 1235.
243. Id. at 1288-93.
244. The standard of review is that a plaintiff must show that the directors acted
unreasonably. See id. at 1244-48; Velasco, supra note 138, at 876-79.
245. The standard of review is irrationality or waste. See Velasco, supra note 148, at 1252-
56.
246. But see infra Part IV.C.
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a gross negligence standard applies; to the duty of loyalty, a fairness
standard applies in the face of self-dealing; to the duty of good faith,
an intentional misconduct standard applies; to the duty of objectiv-
ity, a reasonableness standard applies in the face of structural bias;
and to the duty of rationality, a waste standard applies.247 It is
important to keep in mind, however, the reason why this is done. As
discussed earlier, it is not because standards of conduct are unim-
portant,248 nor is it because standards of conduct are unachievable.
Rather, it is a policy decision made to balance competing values.
Because of the limits of litigation, standards of review are lowered
so that corporate governance does not interfere with the purpose of
corporations—wealth generation through entrepreneurialism.249
Properly understood, standards of review are the outliers and
standards of conduct are unexceptional.
B. The Viability of the Unenforced Requirement
In the previous Section, I argued that fiduciary duty standards of
conduct are not aspirational in the sense of being unenforceable
or unachievable. They are ordinary standards that could be en-
forced, but which we decide not to enforce for prudential reasons.
Nevertheless, I insisted that they are fiduciary duties and, as such,
they are mandatory and binding upon directors. This raises the
question of whether an “unenforced duty” is a meaningful concept.
According to some scholars, the answer is no. Oliver Wendell
Holmes famously argued that the law must be understood from the
perspective of the “bad man,” for whom law is coextensive with
enforcement.250 Although this position has some intuitive intellec-
tual appeal, one should not mistake it for a descriptively accurate
assessment.251
247. See Velasco, supra note 148, at 1237-56.
248. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
249. See supra Part II.B.
250. See supra note 97.
251. To rebut the Holmesian argument would be beyond the scope of this Article. See Henry
M. Hart, Jr., Comment, Holmes’ Positivism—An Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV. 929, 932-33
(1957) (challenging Holmes). But see Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice
Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REV. 529, 541-42 (1951) (insisting that Holmes has been misinterpreted).
See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-88, 132-44 (1961) (contradicting Holmes
by noting that a clear set of rules exists and that people adhere to them out of obligation
rather than fear of punishment).
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In fact, fear of punishment is only one factor that motivates
people to obey the law. In his book, Why People Obey the Law, Tom
R. Tyler argues that there are least four factors that motivate
people.252 The first is the instrumental perspective—essentially, fear
of punishment.253 The second and third, which are very different
from the first, are the “normative perspectives” of personal morality
and legitimacy:254 “[P]ersonal morality means obeying a law because
one feels the law is just; ... legitimacy means obeying a law because
one feels that the authority enforcing the law has the right to
dictate behavior.”255 A fourth factor is social relations, or a concern
with the social consequences of one’s actions.256 Tyler distinguishes
the four as follows:
Consider a specific illegal activity such as using cocaine. What
is a person’s motivation for complying with the law prohibiting
its use? If people refrain from using drugs because they think
laws ought to be obeyed, then legitimate authority is influencing
their behavior. If they do so because drug abuse violates their
convictions, then personal morality is influencing their behavior.
If they fear being caught and sent to prison, deterrence is
influencing their behavior. And if they do not use drugs because
they fear the disapproval of their friends, the social group is
exerting its influence.257
The unenforced duty may not be a meaningful concept for those
who are motivated solely by fear of punishment. Because there is no
punishment, there is no reason to obey the law. However, few
people, if any, are motivated solely by the fear of punishment, or
any one factor. People are complex and are motivated by different
concerns to varying degrees. Thus, even one who is motivated
primarily by fear of punishment is likely influenced by other
concerns as well. Even one who is motivated solely by fear of
punishment may have to factor in the possibility that the unen-
forced duty may be enforced after all. As argued in the previous
Section, the standard of conduct is potentially enforceable. The
252. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3-5 (2006).
253. Id. at 4.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 23-24.
257. Id. at 25.
2012] CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES 573
Disney trial court’s statements to the contrary notwithstanding,258
laws do change over time. Therefore, one could conclude that there
is more to fear from a “currently unenforced” duty than from a mere
aspirational ideal.259
The unenforced duty becomes significantly more meaningful
when the other motivating factors are taken into consideration. This
is most obvious with respect to legitimacy: “People generally feel
that existing legal authorities are legitimate, and this legitimacy
promotes compliance with the law.”260 Empirically, “legitimacy has
a significant independent effect on compliance, even when other
potential causal factors are controlled for.”261 Tyler’s study found
that legitimacy can be a factor even more significant than deter-
rence.262 Stanley Milgram’s well-known study of obedience to au-
thority suggests how powerful the influence of legitimacy can be.263
Milgram described his experiment as follows:
I set up a simple experiment at Yale University to test how
much pain an ordinary citizen would inflict on another person
simply because he was ordered to by an experimental scientist.
Stark authority was pitted against the [participants’] strongest
moral imperatives against hurting others, and, with the [partici-
pants’] ears ringing with the screams of the victims, authority
won more often than not. The extreme willingness of adults to
go to almost any lengths on the command of an authority
constitutes the chief finding of the study.264
Setting aside the issue of its significance relative to deterrence,
legitimacy surely is an important factor leading to voluntary
compliance with law. Moreover, it seems difficult to imagine that
corporate fiduciaries would not consider the courts a legitimate
authority. Thus, if the courts declare standards of conduct to be
law—mandatory and binding—then one can expect at least some
258. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
259. See infra Part IV.C (arguing that standards of conduct are not unenforced, but
underenforced).
260. TYLER, supra note 252, at 170.
261. Id. at 58-59; see also id. at 57-68 (studying the effects of legitimacy on compliance).
262. Id. at 270 (“In fact, the findings of this study suggested that legitimacy was more
influential than was the risk of being caught and punished for rule breaking.”); see also id. at
58-60 (detailing the results of the legitimacy study).
263. See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1974).
264. Stanley Milgram, The Perils of Obedience, HARPER’S MAG., Dec. 1973, at 62, 62.
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voluntary compliance by fiduciaries. By comparison, if the courts
define standards of conduct as aspirational—optional and perhaps
unachievable—then fiduciaries might be less inclined to comply.
After all, the courts’ expertise is law, not morality.
Personal morality also plays a role in compliance with law. At
first, one might think that this factor would be irrelevant as to the
unenforced duty. After all, one’s personal morality should be inter-
nalized and not dependent upon legal labels, such as “unenforced
duty” and “aspirational ideal.” People also are unlikely to have
particularly strong moral convictions with respect to corporate law,
at least by comparison to more controversial areas such as criminal
law or constitutional law. However, “[p]eople generally feel that law
breaking is morally wrong, and that they have a strong obligation
to obey laws even if they disagree with them.”265 Therefore, it may
be effective to consider standards of conduct to be law rather than
aspirational ideals. Moreover, people’s internal views are much
more likely to be consistent with standards of conduct than opposed
to them. Surely, few people would feel a moral obligation to be neg-
ligent, unfair, or dishonest. To the contrary, they probably believe
that they ought to be careful, fair, and honest—even if it is not
terribly important in the corporate context. Finally, the law may be
able to influence personal morality. Many people believe that the
law has an expressive and pedagogical function, and that it can tell
people not only what they must do, but also what they should do.266
Thus, people may be more inclined to believe that a given action is
morally acceptable if it is legal and to believe that it is morally
unacceptable if it is illegal.267 Therefore, declaring standards of
conduct to be law may have an expressive or pedagogical benefit on
compliance. In short, personal morality is a factor that weighs in
favor of the significance of unenforced duties. 
Finally, people may be motivated to obey the law based on social
consequences. Although many might consider this a variant of the
265. TYLER, supra note 252, at 64; see id. at 56.
266. For discussions of the expressive effect of law, see generally Lawrence Lessig, Social
Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); and Cass R. Sunstein,
On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
267. See, e.g., Robert E. Goodin, An Epistemic Case for Legal Moralism, 30 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 615, 629 (2010) (noting that citizens may rely on the inference that illegality and
immorality are coextensive).
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instrumental perspective—with consequences being social rather
than legal—Tyler considers it a hybrid.268 Importantly, he finds that
this factor tends to be linked closely with personal morality.269 It
should similarly support the meaningfulness of the unenforced duty.
This makes intuitive sense: presumably, one would risk greater
disapproval for failure to comply with a law than he would for
failure to live up to an aspirational ideal.
To be sure, fear of punishment is one important factor that
motivates people to comply with the law. But it is not the only fac-
tor, and may not even be the most important factor.270 Even though
the lack of enforcement would tend to reduce the effectiveness of
legal standards of conduct, it should still be beneficial from a
compliance perspective for such standards to be considered law, and
therefore mandatory and binding upon fiduciaries.
The recent work of Professor Lynn Stout is consistent with Tyler’s
conclusions. In her recent book, Cultivating Conscience: How Good
Laws Make Good People, Stout argues that people generally are not
the selfish beings that the term homo economicus suggests.271
Although people can be selfish, they also are capable of prosocial
and unselfish behavior—and, in fact, engage in it regularly.272 Of
particular relevance is the model of human behavior that she
proposes:
Unselfish prosocial behavior toward strangers, including
unselfish compliance with legal and ethical rules, is triggered by
social context, including especially:
(1) instructions from authority;
(2) beliefs about others’ prosocial behavior; and
(3) the magnitude of benefits to others.
Prosocial behavior declines, however, as the personal cost of
acting prosocially increases.273
268. See TYLER, supra note 252, at 23-24. But cf. supra note 43 and accompanying text
(discussing how fear of any type of sanction is essentially a deterrent akin to fear of
punishment under the instrumental perspective).
269. TYLER, supra note 252, at 239 n.6.
270. See supra notes 252-59, 262-65 and accompanying text.
271. See generally LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD
PEOPLE 23-44 (2011) (discussing homo economicus).
272. See id. at 51-71.
273. Id. at 99 (emphasis omitted).
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Among the reasons that she emphasizes these three variables is
that “each of the three variables maps onto one of three universal
and well-studied traits of human nature. These three basic psycho-
logical traits are: obedience to authority; conformity to the behavior
of those around us; and empathy for others.”274 Stout’s conclusion
that people are motivated by factors beyond mere cost-benefit
analysis provides additional support for the meaningfulness of the
unenforced duty.
The first factor that Stout argues promotes “[u]nselfish prosocial
behavior[,] ... including unselfish compliance with legal and ethical
rules,” is “instruction[ ] from authority.”275 This maps on to the
psychological trait of obedience. I submit that standards of conduct
provide a stronger and clearer instruction from authority when they
are deemed mandatory law than when they are called aspirational
ideals—that is, when they are considered obligatory rather than
optional. To be fair, Stout’s model is sufficiently robust to allow for
“instructions” in the form of suggestions rather than mandates, and
it covers “ethical rules” as well as legal ones.276 Clearly, it is better
to suggest that directors ought to act a certain way than not to do so.
However, to insist that they must act a certain way is better than to
suggest that they should. Thus, the unenforced duty is a meaningful
concept.
Stout’s second factor is “beliefs about others’ prosocial behavior,”
which maps on to the psychological trait of conformity.277 Whether
standards of conduct are deemed mandatory or aspirational should
have no direct bearing on this factor. However, it may very well
have a strong indirect effect. For the same reasons that people are
more likely to comply with a mandatory rule than an aspirational
ideal, they are also likely to assume that others will do the same.
Out of sheer conformity, then, a mandatory rule could lead to
greater compliance than an aspirational ideal.
Stout’s third factor, “the magnitude of the benefits to others,”278
is unlikely to be affected—either directly or indirectly—by the legal
designation of standards of conduct as either mandatory or aspi-
274. Id. at 102.
275. Id. at 99; see also id. at 102-06.
276. See id. at 104-05.
277. See id. at 99; see also id. at 106-10.
278. See id. at 99; see also id. at 110-14.
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rational.279 Stout also identifies a fourth social variable, “social
distance,” or the degree of connection between the actor and others
affected by his behavior.280 This factor likely weighs against
compliance with fiduciary duties because shareholders are generally
fairly distant to directors. However, the legal designation of stan-
dards of conduct as either mandatory or aspirational has no bearing
on the issue, so this factor does not weigh against the meaning-
fulness of the unenforced duty.
Stout also acknowledges that “prosocial behavior declines ... as
the personal cost of acting prosocially increases.”281 In other words,
a cost-benefit analysis matters.282 The threat of enforcement would
be very likely to increase compliance. That does not mean that an
unenforced duty would be ignored. Stout’s work suggests that fac-
tors other than personal cost also weigh in an actor’s decision, and
this provides support for the meaningfulness of the unenforced duty.
In the world of corporate law, the meaningfulness of the unen-
forced duty is generally accepted. Courts and scholars generally
agree that directors will comply with fiduciary duty standards of
conduct even without the threat of legal enforcement. There are
many different reasons why this might be true. The three main
theories are based on markets, morality, and norms, and align well
with three of the four theories discussed above. Market theories are
an instrumental perspective, with the fear of punishment focusing
on market forces rather than legal enforcement.283 The theory
suggests that market forces constrain directors’ ability to shirk or
misbehave and compel them to do a good job.284 Morality theories
rely on personal morality. They suggest that directors will internal-
279. It may not be entirely fanciful to imagine that such designation may imply a
conclusion. Presumably, a matter cannot be too serious if it leads to a rule that is only
aspirational, and cannot be frivolous if it leads to a mandatory rule. Of course, whether the
implication would actually affect an actor’s calculus is beyond the scope of this Article.
280. STOUT, supra note 271, at 101.
281. Id. at 99.
282. Id. at 114-115.
283. See Blair & Stout, supra note 37, at 1748.
284. See, e.g., id. at 1737; Charles M. Elson & Robert B. Thompson, Van Gorkom’s Legacy:
The Limits of Judicially Enforced Constraints and the Promise of Proprietary Incentives, 96
NW. U. L. REV. 579, 580-82 (2002) (“Product markets indirectly constrain managers’ decisions,
as do the capital market, the market for managerial services, and the market for corporate
control.”); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 262-73 (1977) (discussing constraint on management
control created by market forces including stock price).
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ize the norms underlying standards of conduct and therefore comply
with them voluntarily.285 Norms theories rely on social relations.
They suggest that directors generally will comply with societal
norms, if only to win the esteem of others and avoid informal sanc-
tions.286 Each of these forces has the effect of fostering compliance
with unenforced standards of conduct.
Nevertheless, there is an important limitation in these theories
as they are employed in corporate law scholarship. In short, market
forces, morality, and social norms are not enough. In combination
with a legal duty, however, they lead to greater compliance.287
Consider first morality theories. Because of their personal moral-
ity, directors can be expected to internalize societal expectations and
comply with standards of conduct voluntarily. In general, people
like to think of themselves as good people who follow the rules;288
but there are limits to people’s willingness to comply with societal
expectations. One obvious limit is that people are less willing to
comply when the cost of compliance significantly outweighs the
benefits of noncompliance.289 I suggest that another important limit
is that people are more willing to comply with mandatory rules than
with optional rules. Although most people would like to be consid-
ered decent, not everyone would care to be considered saintly.
Similarly, whereas most people would like to satisfy their obliga-
285. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1461, 1505 (1989) (“Many or most managers will probably act in the shareholders’ interests,
even if not constrained to do so by market mechanisms, because they have internalized the
moral principles of corporate stewardship.”); see also supra notes 98-99 and accompanying
text.
286. See, e.g., Rock, supra note 16, at 1010-14; Rock & Wachter, supra note 21, at 1641
(“Some [NLERS] are enforced by third parties through the application of peer pressure,
shaming, or threats to one’s reputation.”). 
287. “Taken separately, neither markets, morals, nor law are in themselves sufficient to
curb traditional and positional conflicts. Taken together, however, markets, morals, and law
have shown themselves capable of achieving that objective.” Eisenberg, supra note 285, at
1525.
288. See supra note 99 and accompanying text; see also William T. Allen, 20th Century
Evolution and Growth of Delaware Corporation Law, DEL. LAW., Winter 1999/2000, at 16, 20
(“Corporate directors ... will even prefer to incur some cost to be able to say to themselves (and
their families) that they have done the right thing.”); Blair & Stout, supra note 37, at 1750-51
(discussing constraints on behavior that arise from individuals’ desire to act with integrity).
289. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 37, at 1774 (“Studies have found that, while people
do cooperate in social dilemma games, as the personal cost associated with cooperating rises
(that is, as players’ expected gains from defection increase), cooperation rates begin to
decline.”).
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tions, not everyone would care to go above and beyond the call of
duty. Thus, from the perspective of morality, we can expect greater
compliance with rules that are considered mandatory than with
those that are considered optional.
The same limitation applies with respect to market theories and
norms theories, although it is perhaps less obvious. Market forces
and informal sanctions limit directors’ ability to engage in miscon-
duct. These forces only go so far, however. They are more likely to
punish illegal behavior than to require virtuous behavior. Thus,
they are more likely to demand compliance with a legal duty than
with an aspirational ideal.
Finally, legitimacy can be an independent basis of compliance by
directors. Even where market forces, personal morality, and social
norms fall short, directors may nevertheless feel obligated to comply
with their legal duties. The same cannot be said of aspirational
ideals.
The limits of market forces, morality, and social norms are
particularly significant in important corporate law situations.
Fiduciary duties exist to prevent directors from profiting at the
expense of shareholders, whether by shirking, self-dealing, or
otherwise.290 There is always an incentive to breach fiduciary duties,
and often the incentives are significant. To label fiduciary duty
standards of conduct as aspirational ideals will reduce directors’
incentives to behave. When faced with a choice between compliance
and personal profits, directors will find it easier to rationalize a self-
serving decision. Conflicted directors, when weighing the costs and
benefits of compliance, may conclude that aspirational and unen-
forceable standards of conduct are not only optional, but possibly
unreasonable and even simply wrong. This may severely impede the
process of internalization by directors; if widespread, this attitude
may undermine the social norm among the relevant peer group—
other directors.291 Such rationalization would be significantly more
difficult in the face of a clear legal duty. Although some misconduct
290. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND.
L. REV. 1399, 1482 (2002) (“[T]he purpose of fiduciary duty is to combat opportunism.”).
291. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 252, at 24 (“Group influence may also exert normative
pressure on people, because individuals look to their social groups for information about
appropriate conduct.... People’s behavior is strongly affected by the normative climate created
by others.”).
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will always persist, greater compliance can be expected if standards
of conduct are considered legal duties. 
In short, the unenforced duty is a meaningful concept.
Psychological studies suggest that fear of punishment is only one
factor motivating compliance with law.292 Legitimacy, personal
morality, and social relations are also factors.293 Corporate law
generally accepts the premise behind the unenforced duty; in fact,
it relies upon voluntary compliance by directors. Such voluntary
compliance, however, is much more likely to follow a legal duty than
an aspirational ideal.
C. Is There Enforcement After All?
Throughout this Article, I have assumed that standards of
conduct reflect unenforced duties. However, this is not the only
plausible interpretation. In this final Section, I will suggest that
standards of conduct reflect not unenforced duties, but under-
enforced duties.
As I have argued in previous work, fiduciary duties can be
thought of in many different ways, none of which is necessarily
more valid than the others.294 Thus, for example, depending upon
the level of abstraction used to view fiduciary duties, it is equally
valid to say that there is only one fiduciary duty, or two, or three, or
five, or virtually any number.295 Likewise, it is possible to view
standards of conduct and standards of review as different fiduciary
duties. Implicitly, this is the sense in which the Article has dis-
cussed fiduciary duties thus far: standards of review are those
fiduciary duties that are enforced, and standards of conduct are
those fiduciary duties that are not enforced.
Under another view, standards of conduct and standards of
review are not different fiduciary duties at all. Rather, both are
aspects of the same fiduciary duty. Each fiduciary duty therefore
has a standard of conduct and a standard of review associated with
it. Under this view, fiduciary duties are not enforced to the fullest
extent possible—that is, the standards of conduct—but only to a
lesser extent—the standards of review. Thus, it is not appropriate
292. Id. at 3-5.
293. Id.
294. See generally Velasco, supra note 148.
295. See id. at 1285-88.
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to say that standards of conduct represent unenforced duties and
standards of review represent enforced duties. A more appropriate
description would be that standards of conduct represent the limit
of fiduciary duties, and standards of review represent the extent to
which they are enforced.
Viewed in this light, the problem of the unenforced duty disap-
pears. After all, no law is perfectly enforced. Perfect enforcement is
prohibitively expensive.296 For every law, society must make two
important decisions: the substantive content and the level of
enforcement. Often, the enforcement issue is resolved by deciding
upon the number of policemen there should be. With more police-
men, greater enforcement becomes possible. Sometimes, however,
the issue is dealt with by deciding upon the tools that shall be
available for enforcement. A common example would be the decision
of whether to allow private causes of action. If private action sup-
plements government action, greater enforcement is possible.297
However, other tools also affect the level of enforcement. Pleading
standards and evidentiary burdens certainly have a significant,
albeit indirect, effect. Corporate law uses all of these tools, and goes
a bit further by creating a divergence between standards of conduct
and standards of review. Ultimately, however, the divergence is just
another tool that the law uses to determine the appropriate level of
enforcement.298
In short, the difference between corporate law and other bodies
of law is actually one of degree rather than kind. Like any other
body of law, corporate law has decided upon methods appropriate for
296. George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 526-27
(1970); see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 563-64 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing
the cost of enforcement in the context of procedural due process).
297. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (“Private enforcement of the proxy
rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission action. As in antitrust treble damage
litigation, the possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief serves as a most effective weapon
in the enforcement of the proxy requirements. The Commission advises that it examines over
2,000 proxy statements annually and each of them must necessarily be expedited. Time does
not permit an independent examination of the facts set out in the proxy material and this
results in the Commission’s acceptance of the representations contained therein at their face
value, unless contrary to other material on file with it.”).
298. As previously discussed, the divergence is largely a manifestation of the business
judgment rule, see supra notes 140-62 and accompanying text, which the courts call a
“presumption.” A comprehensive understanding of the divergence would add the concepts of
pleading standards and evidentiary burdens, but these are all typical litigation devices.
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enforcement, even if imperfect. Like all law, fiduciary duties are not
unenforced, but underenforced. 
A simple thought experiment should help to demonstrate that
standards of conduct really are underenforced fiduciary duties
rather than unenforced duties. Earlier in this Article, I argued that
the divergence is ultimately rooted in the limits of litigation.299 I
now suggest that if those limits could be eliminated, standards of
conduct would be enforced.
How can the limits of litigation be overcome? Fortunately, it is
easier than one might suspect. All that is required is the elimination
of the fact-finding and fact-characterization process, which is prone
to error. This can be done by a stipulation of the facts. Assume that
the parties to a case agree that the directors satisfied the standard
of review but knowingly failed to satisfy the standard of conduct. I
submit that the director would—or at least should—be held liable
for breach of fiduciary duty.
The easiest case to illustrate is the duty of care. Assume that a
director knew he was behaving negligently, but the parties agree
that he was not grossly negligent. At first glance, it might seem odd
to suggest that someone could be “knowingly negligent.” In fact,
there is nothing problematic about the suggestion. For example,
assume that the director has to review a merger agreement before
the board meeting at which he must vote on a merger. The director
knows that, given his abilities, he must spend ten hours reviewing
the document to understand it adequately. Even so, he knows that
he can get by with a quick, one-hour review. By his own admission,
ten hours is the threshold for negligence, and one hour is the
threshold for gross negligence. Knowing this, he spends three hours
reviewing the document. He is clearly negligent, but clearly not
grossly negligent. Because he is fully aware of this at the time he
acts, he is knowingly negligent in his duties.
A similar hypothetical could be crafted for the duty of loyalty.
Assume a conflict of interest transaction in which a director acts in
a way that could be defended as fair, but which the director believes
was not actually in the interests of the shareholders. For example,
the director buys property from or sells property to the corporation
at the price specified by an impartial appraiser, but which he
believes is a bad deal for the corporation. Again, the director might
299. See supra Part II.B.
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satisfy the entire fairness test, but he would not be acting in the
interests of shareholders.300
In either case, I submit that the director would be held liable for
breach of fiduciary duty, assuming, with respect to the duty of care
example, that there is no exculpation provision in the corporate
charter. With certitude that the director violated the standard of
conduct based on his own admission, a court would have no reason
not to hold him liable.301 Liability would not interfere with the goals
of the business judgment rule.
Of course, I may be wrong. Without precedent, it is difficult to
predict a judicial response with any confidence. Perhaps all that I
can say based on the above facts is that the courts should hold
directors liable. Nevertheless, if I am wrong, I am not off the mark
by much. With only a minor change in the facts assumed above, I
am confident that the courts would enforce the standard of conduct.
That minor change would be to change the directors’ mens rea from
knowing to intentional.302
In the first hypothetical above, assume that the director not only
knows that he should spend ten hours reviewing the documents and
fails to do so, but actually intends to spend only three hours. In
other words, he does not get sidetracked with other matters, but
rather decides to spend only three hours on the job so that he can
spend the other seven hours playing golf. He is intentionally neg-
ligent, but avoids gross negligence. In this case, it can be said with
300. As I have suggested elsewhere, it is fair to say that there are five fiduciary duties. See
Velasco, supra note 148, at 1288-93. In addition to care and loyalty, there are good faith,
objectivity, and rationality. Id. Similar hypotheticals could be devised for the three additional
duties. For the duty of good faith, a director could satisfy the standard of review but not the
standard of conduct by not putting in much effort but avoiding intentional misconduct. For
the duty of objectivity, a director could do so by reaching a conclusion that is defensible as
reasonable even though it is in fact calculated to benefit management. And for the duty of
rationality, a director could do so by reaching a decision that does not benefit shareholders
but cannot be characterized as waste.
301. The only reason not to do so at that point is for fear of the precedential value for other
cases in which the evidence is not so clear. Although that may be a legitimate institutional
concern, it is based on the limits of litigation, rather than the merits. My hypothetical
assumes away such concerns in order to make a substantive point.
302. “Knowing” generally means “[h]aving or showing awareness or understanding; well-
informed.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 950 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 9th ed. 2009). “Intentional”
means “[d]one with the aim of carrying out the act.” Id. at 883. Intentional acts are done
knowingly, but knowing acts need not be intentional. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)-(b)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962) (distinguishing between “knowingly” and “purposely”).
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confidence that he would be found liable. Why is that? It is because
the director would be guilty of an intentional dereliction of duty—
that is, intentional misconduct—and thus would be in violation of
the standard of review for the duty of good faith.303
In other words, fiduciary duty standards of conduct may be
enforced through the duty of good faith. Although this will be true
only in extreme circumstances—when the misconduct is intentional
—that is a reasonably appropriate condition given the limits of
litigation that prompt the business judgment rule. To be clear, I do
not mean to suggest that the purpose of the duty of good faith is to
enforce other standards of conduct. To the contrary, this conclusion
is based on fairly recent pronouncements on the duty of good
faith.304 Nevertheless, it is a perfectly natural development that ties
together various concepts of the law relating to fiduciary duties.
The business judgment rule is considered a presumption of good
faith on the part of directors.305 Based on this “powerful presump-
303. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66-67 (Del. 2006) (upholding
“intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities” as “a legally
appropriate, although not the exclusive, definition of fiduciary bad faith”), aff’g 907 A.2d 693
(Del. Ch. 2005). This may seem inconsistent with other portions of the various Disney
opinions. For example, the supreme court took great effort to draw a “distinction between
conduct that is negligent (or grossly negligent) and conduct that is intentional.” Id. at 66
n.109. However, the court’s point is that conduct that is merely negligent (or grossly
negligent) cannot automatically be considered intentional or in bad faith. In my hypothetical,
it is not the negligence that can lead to liability, but rather the intent that constitutes bad
faith. Similarly, my conclusion may seem at odds with the holding of Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d
362 (Del. 2006), where the court seemed to require an “utter failure” to reach the level of bad
faith, id. at 369. However, Stone is not a problem for two reasons. First, the Stone case dealt
only with director oversight “where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss is
predicated upon ignorance of liability creating activities within the corporation.” Id. (quoting
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996)). My hypothetical
does not involve oversight. Second, the Stone case did not purport to provide an exclusive
definition of bad faith. To the contrary, the court cited to, and drew from, the Disney opinion
extensively. What both Stone and Disney require is “that a failure to act in good faith requires
conduct that is qualitatively [—not quantitatively—] different from, and more culpable than,
the conduct giving rise to a violation of the fiduciary duty of care (i.e., gross negligence).” Id.
(citations omitted). As the court in Stone acknowledged, “[w]here directors fail to act in the
face of a known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their
responsibilities, they breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary
obligation in good faith.” Id. at 370 (citations omitted). My claim is that intentional negligence
is a conscious disregard of responsibilities, or intentional misconduct, that constitutes bad
faith and could lead to liability.
304. See Disney, 906 A.2d at 62-68; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 695,
753-56, 772-79 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27.
305. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
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tion,” plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing a breach of fiduciary
duty.306 However, the business judgment rule also depends upon the
directors’ good faith. Therefore, if the presumption is rebutted and
it is established that directors are not acting in good faith—for
example, because they are engaging in intentional misconduct—
then they are not protected by, and do not deserve the benefits of,
the business judgment rule.307 The standards of conduct can be
enforced. There is no reason to shield directors from the conse-
quences of their malfeasance, and there are no competing values or
incentive issues to weigh.308 Directors who are engaged in inten-
tional misconduct deserve to be held accountable.
Thus, we can say that even the standard of conduct is not entirely
unenforced. For good reasons—based on the limits of litigation—
fiduciary duties are underenforced. In an appropriate case, when
those good reasons are absent, the courts could, should, and argu-
ably would, enforce standards of conduct. In short, standards of
conduct are not unenforceable, or even unenforced, but only under-
enforced. This is a fate shared, to different extents, by all laws.
CONCLUSION
According to the aspirational view of fiduciary duties, standards
of review represent law, whereas standards of conduct represent
aspirational ideals. My goal in this Article has been to rebut this
view and hopefully arrest its growing popularity. Fiduciary duties
encompass both standards of conduct and standards of review. Both
are law, even if only the latter tend to be enforced legally. Because
standards of conduct represent fiduciary duties, they are obligatory
upon directors.
Standards of conduct may be unenforced or underenforced, but
they are not unenforceable. The law assumes that directors will
comply with standards of conduct even without the threat of legal
enforcement. Because of this “voluntary” compliance, legal enforce-
306. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
307. See id. (“To rebut the [business judgment] rule, a shareholder plaintiff assumes the
burden of providing evidence that directors, in reaching their challenged decision, breached
any one of the triads of the their fiduciary duty—good faith, loyalty or due care.”).
308. One possible reason to rule in favor of directors is for fear of the precedential value
that a holding of liability might have in future, less clear cases. However, such a decision
would not be based on the merits, but on the limits of litigation. See supra Part II.B.
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ment is not necessary.309 If such compliance ceases or wanes,
however, legal enforcement may become necessary. In other words,
the aspirational view is on a collision course with itself. If directors
come to believe the claim that standards of conduct are merely
aspirational, then they can be expected to reduce their compliance
over time. At some point, the courts would have to step in and
enforce the standards of conduct. If this were to happen, standards
of conduct would no longer be merely aspirational, and the benefits
of the divergence will be lost.
The better view of fiduciary duties is to recognize that, although
aspiration plays a role, it has nothing to do with the divergence
between standards of conduct and standards of review. Standards
of conduct reflect what we expect and demand of directors, whereas
standards of review reflect what we will hold them accountable for.
In order to fulfill their fiduciary duties, directors must comply with
both. Aspirational ideals are those that go above and beyond the call
of duty. Such behavior can be encouraged and praised, but never
required or enforced.
309. Velasco, supra note 148, at 1239; Velasco, supra note 138, at 834.
